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Abstract 
Does institutional quality enhance or weaken the effect of bank regulations and supervision 
on bank stability? We use a sample of around 1,050 commercial banks from 69 emerging and 
developing economies over the 2004-2013 period and show that the answer to this question 
depends on the type of institutional quality and on the type of bank regulation. Political 
stability strengthens the positive effect of capital regulation and activities restrictions on bank 
stability as measured by the z-score. Control of corruption also enhances the positive effect of 
activities restrictions on stability. On the other hand, the positive effect of capital regulation 
and private monitoring on stability subdues when good quality institutions that induce loan 
repayment, such as strong creditor rights and the rule of law, are present. Finally, we do not 
find strong evidence that the negative effect of supervisory power on bank stability is 
conditioned by institutional quality.  In further analysis, we disaggregate the z-score measure 
and find that institutional quality conditions the effect of bank regulations on stability more 
by affecting profit stability and profitability rather than by influencing capitalisation. These 
findings could be useful for bank regulators in emerging and developing economies in the 
light of the implementation of the Basel III accord. 
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1. Introduction 
The effect of bank regulations and supervision on bank stability is an ongoing debate for both 
academics and policymakers. Several empirical studies find inconclusive results about the 
effect of different types of bank regulation on stability (e.g. Barth et al., 2004; Agoraki et al., 
2011; Anginer et al., 2014).  A source of such inconclusiveness is that various factors could 
condition this relationship. The empirical evidence shows that the effect of bank regulations 
and supervision on stability could depend on corporate governance (Laeven and Levine, 2009), 
bank industry characteristics (Agoraki et al., 2011) and the macroeconomic environment 
(Klomp and Haan, 2015).  For this reason, Delis et al. (2012) stress the importance of 
identifying sources of heterogeneity concerning the effect of different types of bank regulation 
on bank stability. We follow this suggestion and investigate if institutional quality conditions 
the effect of bank regulation and supervision on bank stability. 
Institutional quality could condition the effect of bank regulations and supervision on stability 
because it could enhance the implementation capacity of regulators. Such capacity is of 
importance in the banking sector due to the increasing complexity of bank regulations through 
the Basel I, II and III accords over the years (Haldane and Neumann, 2017).  Institutional 
quality, by improving implementation capacity, could have a complementary relationship with 
bank regulations and supervision concerning their effect on stability. We name this hypothesis 
as the “institutional quality-regulation enforcement” hypothesis. We identify three institutional 
quality characteristics that could enhance regulatory implementation capacity. These are 
political stability, the control of corruption and the rule of law. Theoretical models and 
empirical evidence from the economics and the political economy literature show that these 
three types of institutional quality induce regulatory enforcement (Knack and Keefer, 1995; 
Damania et al., 2004; Acemoglu and Verdier, 2000; Jiang and Nie, 2014; Oliva, 2015). 
However, institutional quality could instead have a substitution relationship with bank 
regulations and supervision because the former could induce the efficient functioning of the 
lending market.  Good institutional quality in terms of political stability, control of corruption 
and the rule of law, could reduce adverse selection and borrower moral hazard, improve the 
lending terms and thus improve loan repayment (Bae and Goyal, 2009; Schiantarelli et al., 
2016). This, in turn, could moderate the effect of bank regulation and supervision on bank 
stability. For example, capital regulation, which forces banks to hold more capital in order to 
absorb potential losses, could be less useful for bank stability in an institutional setting that 
induces loan repayment and thus limits bank losses. We name the hypothesis that suggests a 
substitution relationship between institutional quality and bank regulation and supervision 
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concerning bank stability as the “institutional quality-loan repayment” hypothesis. Moreover, 
we expand this hypothesis to two additional institutional quality characteristics. These are the 
strength of creditor rights and credit information sharing. These two institutional arrangements 
could decrease the information asymmetry between lenders and borrowers and thus could be 
conducive to loan repayment (Houston et al., 2010). 
A suitable testing ground for our two hypotheses are the emerging and developing economies. 
To begin with, emerging and developing economies exhibit a high degree of cross-country 
variation both in terms of bank regulation and supervision and in terms of institutional quality. 
Additionally, the regulation implementation capacity of many emerging and developing 
economies is weak (Chong et al., 2014). Thus, institutions that could enhance regulatory 
enforcement could be important for the effect of bank regulations on stability. Furthermore, 
these countries exhibit high information asymmetry between lenders and borrowers (Fosu, 
2014). Hence, institutions that induce loan repayment could be essential for bank stability. The 
above points suggest that focusing on emerging and developing economies is interesting in 
terms of investigating the conditioning effects of institutional quality on the relationship 
between bank regulations and supervision and bank stability both through the “institutional 
quality-regulation enforcement” hypothesis and through the “institutional quality-loan 
repayment” hypothesis.   
To this end, we use a dataset of approximately 1,050 commercial banks from 69 emerging and 
developing economies over the 2004-2013 period.  Regarding bank regulations and 
supervision, we follow previous studies (e.g. Hoque et al., 2015)  and focus on i) capital 
requirements regulation, ii) official supervisory power, iii) private monitoring, and iv) activities 
restrictions. We source comparable indices for these types of bank regulations from Barth et 
al., (2013)4. Furthermore, we source institutional quality indicators from the World Governance 
Indicators and the Doing Business projects of the World Bank.  As in previous studies (e.g 
Houston et al, 2010; Beck et al., 2013), we measure bank stability in terms of z-score and 
provide a rich set of findings. We obtain these findings from models that employ the two-step 
system generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator (Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell 
and Bond, 1998) which takes into account both the persistence of bank stability and the 
potential endogeneity between bank regulations and supervision with bank stability.  
                                                          
4
 The dataset on bank regulation and supervision of Barth et al. (2013) represents the most diligent effort to date in 
order to standardise and render comparable, both across time and across countries, indices of bank regulation and 
supervision. This dataset builds on the different bank regulatory survey waves by the World Bank since 1999.   
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Overall, we find that institutional quality conditions the relationship of bank regulation and 
supervision with bank stability but not in a uniform way. Political stability and control of 
corruption emerge as the institutional quality characteristics that condition the effect of bank 
regulations and supervision on stability more in line with the “institutional quality-regulation 
enforcement” hypothesis. We find that the positive effect of capital regulation and activities 
restrictions on bank stability strengthens in the presence of higher political stability. 
Furthermore, control of corruption enhances the positive effect of activities restriction on bank 
stability. On the other hand, institutional characteristics that are highly conducive to loan 
repayment, such as strong creditor rights and the rule of law, condition the effect of bank 
regulation and supervision on stability more in line with the “institutional-quality-loan 
repayment” hypothesis. The empirical findings show that the positive effect of capital 
regulation and private monitoring on bank stability subdues at higher levels of creditor rights 
and rule of law respectively. Finally, we find only limited evidence that institutional quality 
conditions the negative effect of official supervisory power on bank stability. In further 
analysis, we disaggregate the z-score to its components and show that institutional quality 
conditions the effect of bank regulations on stability more by affecting bank profit stability and 
profitability rather than by influencing bank capitalisation. Most of these results are robust in 
models that employ alternative institutional quality variables and in models that use 
institutional quality measures that we derive from a principal component analysis. 
This study contributes to the literature in four ways. Firstly, we add to the literature that 
examines the effects of bank regulations and supervision on bank stability (e.g. Hoque et al., 
2015). We show that institutional quality plays an important role in explaining the cross-
country variation of the effect of bank regulations on stability. Thus, this study improves our 
understanding of the association between bank regulations and stability and informs the 
inconclusive yet debate about this relationship. Secondly, we employ a rich set of 
disaggregated measures of institutional quality. This enables us to identify the specific 
institutional quality characteristics that have a complementary or a substitution relationship 
with different types of bank regulations concerning the effect of the latter on bank stability. 
The use of disaggregated measures of institutional quality is also useful in terms of informing 
policy in a more focused manner. Therefore, we also add to the limited research that uses 
aggregate indicators to investigate if institutional factors influence the effect of bank 
regulations on stability (Klomp and Haan, 2014). Thirdly, by focusing on emerging and 
developing economies, we also add to the literature that examines the determinants of bank 
stability in these countries (e.g. Drakos et al, 2016). Emerging and developing economies are 
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the drivers of global growth and their banking systems represent a growing part of the global 
banking sector. Hence, examining the factors that could contribute to bank stability in these 
countries is of increasing importance.  Finally, by providing empirical evidence from the 
banking sector, we also contribute to the wider economics literature that investigates the 
conditioning effects of institutional quality on the relationship between regulations and 
economic outcomes (e.g. Dreher and Gassebner 2013; Jiang and Nie, 2014; Oliva, 2015). 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: section 2 presents some theoretical considerations 
and develops the hypotheses, section 3 presents the data and the methods, section 4 reports and 
discusses the results, whilst the final section offers some concluding remarks together with 
some policy implications.  
 
2. Theoretical Considerations and Hypotheses Development 
In this section, we first provide a brief overview of the mechanisms through which the main 
types of bank regulation and supervision could affect bank stability and present the main 
findings from previous empirical research. Then, we develop the hypotheses about the potential 
conditioning effect of institutional quality on the relationship between bank regulation and 
supervision and bank stability. 
2.1 Overview of the Relationship between Bank Regulation and Supervision with Bank 
Stability 
Capital regulation could benefit bank stability by encouraging banks to hold higher capital 
buffers and enhancing their loss absorption capacity (Dagher et al., 2016). Some studies 
provide empirical evidence that stringent capital requirements decrease non-performing loans 
and bank risk (Agoraki et al., 2011; Tan and Floros, 2013).  On the other hand, capital 
regulation could hamper bank stability by decreasing the motivation of lenders to monitor loans 
(Kopecky and VanHoose, 2006). Recent empirical findings show that capital regulation 
increases non-performing loans (Osei-Assibey and Asenso, 2015).  
Official supervisory power could increase bank stability by allowing regulators to prevent and 
correct banks' problems (Anginer and Demirguc-Kunt, 2014). The beneficial effect of 
supervisory power on bank stability assumes the “public interest view” of supervision (Barth et 
al, 2008). This view posits that regulatory officials act in the interest of the public and promote 
bank stability. In support of this view, some empirical studies show that supervisory power 
benefits bank stability through better loan quality and lower moral hazard (Agoraki et al., 2011; 
Shehzad and Haan, 2015). However, a strong supervisor could exploit its power and influence 
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bank credit allocation in order to reap private gains (Beck et al., 2006). This could result in 
lower loan quality and thus a decrease in bank stability (Beltratti and Stulz, 2012). The 
potential negative effect of supervisory power on bank stability assumes the “private interest 
view” of supervision (Barth et al, 2008). This view suggests that supervisors target to maximise 
their own welfare. 
Regulation that enhances the private monitoring of banks from depositors, debt holders, and 
equity holders could benefit bank stability by improving market discipline and decreasing risk-
taking incentives and moral hazard (Anginer et al., 2014). On the other hand, the higher 
disclosure requirements that private monitoring mandates might lower the incentive of bank 
creditors to roll over their funds in the case of a negative signal (Bouvard et al., 2015).  Banks 
could try to compensate for this by increasing their risk. 
Finally, activities restrictions could improve bank stability by limiting the engagement of banks 
in non-interest income activities. Such activities are particularly risky because they exhibit high 
earnings volatility (Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 2010) and thus could hamper bank stability 
(DeYoung and Torna, 2013). Conversely, activities restrictions could decrease bank stability 
by limiting diversification benefits (Kohler, 2015).   
The above discussion suggests that the effect of bank regulation and supervision on bank 
stability could be either positive or negative. We posit that the relative strength of the 
individual, positive or negative, effect of bank regulation and supervision on bank stability 
could be a function of a country’s institutional quality. This means that institutional quality 
could condition the effect of bank regulation and supervision on bank stability.  In the next part 
of section 2, we formulate two such conditioning hypotheses.  
2.2  The Conditioning Effect of Institutional Quality on the Relationship between Bank 
Regulation and Supervision with Bank Stability 
 
2.2.1 The “Institutional Quality-Regulation Enforcement” Hypothesis 
The mere existence of a regulation on paper does not necessarily imply its application in 
practice. We hypothesise that institutional quality in terms of political stability, the rule of law 
and control of corruption could enhance the implementation capacity of a country’s regulators. 
Therefore, institutional quality could complement bank regulation and supervision. We name 
this potential complementary relationship as the “institutional quality-regulation enforcement” 
hypothesis.  
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Political stability improves the ability and the consistency of the regulatory enforcement 
mechanisms (Knack and Keefer, 1995; Roe and Siegel, 2011). Damania et al., (2004) provide 
empirical evidence that political instability weakens the institutions that are necessary to 
monitor and enforce regulatory compliance.  Therefore, a channel through which the lack of 
political stability could diminish the implementation capacity of bank regulators could be its 
harmful effect on the operational capability of the latter. Through another channel, economic 
agents, such as banks, could be less likely to comply with regulations in countries with low 
political stability because of the uncertainty about regulation and government policy that this 
lack of political stability implies (Baker et al., 2015). 
The role of control of corruption is also important in terms of enforcement of regulations. 
Theoretical models in the legal and economic literature provide strong support to the concept 
that corruption reduces regulatory compliance (e.g. Acemoglu and Verdier, 2000; Aidt, 2003).  
In support of these theoretical predictions, many studies provide empirical evidence that firms 
operating in a corrupt environment attempt to circumvent regulations through bribery (see e.g. 
Mendoza et al., 2015; Oliva, 2015).  Therefore, one could argue that an environment of high 
control of corruption promotes the implementation and observance of regulations. 
The rule of law, which is a measure of perceptions of law observance and judicial efficiency, 
could also induce regulatory enforcement. Berger and Udell (2006) point out the 
complementary relationship of regulations with the judicial environment. Several studies 
provide empirical evidence that higher levels of rule of law and judicial efficiency enhance 
regulatory enforcement (see e.g. Caballero et al., 2013; Daher, 2017).  The channels through 
which higher rule of law and judicial efficiency could lead to stronger regulatory enforcement 
is through the higher probability of detection of irregularities (Olken, 2007) and an increase in 
the probability of prosecution and conviction (Alt and Lassen, 2014).  
Based on the above discussion, we formulate the “institutional quality-regulation enforcement” 
hypothesis as follows: 
H.1: Institutional quality could enhance the effect of bank regulations and supervision on 
bank stability. 
2.2.2 The “Institutional Quality-Loan Repayment” Hypothesis 
We also hypothesise that institutional quality could contribute to a well-functioning lending 
market by improving the lending terms, reducing adverse selection and borrower moral hazard 
and increasing the probability of loan repayment. Hence, institutional quality could be a 
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substitute for bank regulation and supervision. We name this potential substitution relationship 
as the “institutional quality-loan repayment” hypothesis.  
Political stability could improve the lending terms and therefore reduce borrower moral hazard 
and decrease loan defaults. Francis et al. (2014) provide evidence from the syndicated loan 
market that political uncertainty increases the cost of bank loans. Similarly, Bradley et al. 
(2016) find that policy risk increases the cost of debt of firms. Furthermore, strong political 
institutions could have a positive effect on firm transparency and disclosure (Bushman et al. 
2004). This could improve the quantity and the accuracy of the information that banks have on 
borrowers. Consequently, banks could reduce adverse selection and price loans more 
efficiently. 
Control of corruption could also promote efficient lending and increase the probability of loan 
repayment.  One channel through which control of corruption could achieve this is by reducing 
lending corruption, which is an important reason of loan losses in many countries (Beck et al. 
2006; Akins et al. 2017).  Additionally, Bae and Goyal (2009) provide empirical evidence that 
loan spreads are higher in countries with higher levels of corruption. One explanation is that 
corruption could restrain the financial performance of borrower firms (Hanousek et al., 2017) 
and thus render loan losses more probable. Furthermore, corruption could undermine the 
institutions that ensure the enforcement of loan contracts and thus increase borrower moral 
hazard (Weill, 2011). 
The latter point highlights the importance of the rule of law, especially as far as concerns a 
competent judiciary, for the efficient operation of the lending market. Laeven and Majnoni 
(2005) show that judicial inefficiency increases loan spreads and thus renders loan repayment 
harder. Furthermore, Bae and Goyal (2009) find that in the case of a loan default, an inefficient 
judicial system reduces the recovery rate and increases the time needed to repossess collateral. 
This could increase the moral hazard of borrowers. In the presence of a slow and inefficient 
judicial process, opportunistic borrowers might choose to default because the loan recovery 
costs might not make economic sense for the lender (Jappelli et al., 2005; Schiantarelli et al., 
2016). 
There are two additional institutional quality characteristics relevant to the “institutional 
quality-loan repayment hypothesis”. These are the strength of creditor rights and credit 
information sharing. These institutional arrangements reduce the information asymmetry 
between lenders and borrowers and could induce loan repayment. Thus, they could have a 
substitution relationship with bank regulation and supervision. Creditor rights could reduce 
adverse selection and improve loan screening efficiency by facilitating the use of collateral and 
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enhancing its signaling function, (Bester, 1985). Creditor rights could also reduce borrowers’ 
moral hazard and loan losses by enabling banks to force loan repayment (Acharya et al., 2011; 
Fang et al., 2014).  Information sharing, by providing information on the past behavior of 
borrowers, could enable loan screening and thus reduce adverse selection (Dierkes et al., 2013). 
Information sharing could also reduce borrowers’ moral hazard by incentivising them to avoid 
a loan default that would blacklist them and exclude them from future access to finance 
(Padilla and Pagano, 2000). Several studies provide empirical evidence that information 
sharing improves loan repayment and bank stability (see e.g. Houston et al., 2010). 
Based on the above discussion, we formulate the “institutional quality-loan repayment” 
hypothesis as follows: 
H.2: Institutional quality could moderate the effect of bank regulations and supervision on 
bank stability. 
Activities restrictions could provide an exception to the above hypothesis. This type of 
regulation reduces the possibility that banks could diversify away from the traditional lending 
market. Therefore, in the case that the individual effect of activities restrictions on bank 
stability is positive, the presence of good institutions that promote loan repayment could further 
enhance this impact. In this case, the “institutional quality-loan repayment” channel suggests a 
complementary relationship between activities restrictions and institutions. Conversely, if the 
individual effect of activities restrictions on bank stability is negative, then good institutions, 
by inducing loan repayment, could lessen such a negative impact. In such a case, the 
“institutional quality-loan repayment” channel posits a substitution relationship between 
activities restrictions regulation and institutions. Thus, for activities restrictions, we modify 
hypothesis H.2 to hypothesis H.35: 
H.3: Institutional quality could enhance (moderate) the positive (negative) effect of activities 
restrictions regulation on bank stability. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
5
 The Figures A1 and A2 of the appendix illustrate the theoretical framework of the hypotheses (Figure A1 for the 
hypothesis H.1 in relation to the hypothesis H.2 and Figure A2 for the hypothesis H.1 in relation to the hypothesis 
H.3). 
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3. Data and Methods 
3.1 Data  
3.1.1 Sample  
The sample of the study is an unbalanced panel of 1,052 commercial banks operating in 69 
emerging and developing economies over the 2004-2013 period that comprises 5,854 bank-
year observations6. We follow several studies and focus the analysis on commercial banks for 
which lending is their main business line (e.g. Delis, 2012; Laeven et al., 2016). Furthermore, 
regulatory indices and bank stability theories tend to focus on the operations of commercial 
banks and a homogenous sample in terms of bank types improves comparability (Pasiouras et 
al., 2009). To classify countries as emerging or developing we use the 2013 version of the 
World Bank income classification (Delis, 2012). More specifically, we define countries as 
emerging or developing if they belong to the middle or the low-income categories of the World 
Bank classification. Finally, the period of the analysis, 2004-2013, reflects the data availability 
of some of the explanatory variables7.  
 
3.1.2 Measuring bank stability 
We employ z-score as a measure of bank stability. This is the standard bank stability measure 
in most empirical studies (e.g. Houston et al., 2010; Ashraf, 2017).  The z-score
 
is calculated by 
the sum of a bank’s return on assets (ROA) and the equity-to-assets ratio (EQAS) over the 
standard deviation of its return on assets (SDROA). Specifically, z-score = 
(EQAS+ROA)/SDROA8. The z-score
 
of a bank is its distance from insolvency as it represents 
                                                          
6
 See Table A1 of the appendix for the countries included in the study. The initial sample was 1,156 banks from 69 
countries. However, due to data availability for some banks the final sample consists of 1,052 banks.  
7
 For example, some of the institutional quality measures such as creditor right and information sharing are 
available in a consistent manner (i.e. same data methodology) from the World Bank for the 2004-2013 period. 
8
 We have also performed estimations that employ as a measure of bank stability the adjusted z-score which is 
based on the Return on Equity (ROE). We obtain similar findings when we use this alternative bank stability 
measure. 
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the number of standard deviations that a bank’s ROA has to fall for the bank to become 
insolvent (Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 2010). We calculate the standard deviation of ROA 
using three-year rolling time windows (Beck et al, 2013). This method avoids that the standard 
deviation of ROA is calculated over different window lengths for different banks.  
Furthermore, we use the natural logarithm of z-score (lnz-score) to smooth out high values of 
z-scores as they are highly skewed (Beck et al. 2013).  To estimate z-scores we source bank-
specific data from Bankscope.  
 
 
3.1.3 Bank regulations and Supervision 
To provide a comprehensive view of bank regulation and supervision, we source regulatory 
variables from the three most recent global surveys of Barth et al. (2013) in, 2002, 2006, and 
2011. Since the bank regulation and supervision indices change slowly over time, we follow 
the literature and use the previously available regulatory survey data until a new survey 
becomes available (Anginer et al., 2014). Specifically, we assign the 2002 survey data for the 
2004-2005 period, the 2006 survey data for the 2006-2010 period and the 2011 survey data for 
the 2011- 2013 period. The four-bank regulation and supervision variables we employ are the 
following: 
Capital regulations (CS): This index concerns regulations that require banks to hold a 
minimum rate of capital to protect banks from insolvency.  It measures the stringency of capital 
regulations by examining whether banks have flexible minimum capital-asset ratios under 
different types of risks, and how banks deduct market value losses from capital before having 
the pre-determined minimum capital adequacy. The index also considers the initial capital 
stringency by determining whether some sources of funds used to raise the initial disbursement 
of capital are allowed. The capital regulations index can take values between 0-10, where 
higher values represent more stringency.  
Official supervisory power (OP):  Measures the extent to which supervisory authorities have 
the power to access banks’ information and whether they can take specific actions to prevent or 
address problems such as fraud and insider abuse.  The official supervisory power index ranges 
from 0-14 and higher values indicate more power.  
Private monitoring (PM): This index refers to the degree to which regulatory and supervisory 
policies provide private investors the power to monitor banks’ operation and governance. The 
private monitoring index investigates whether banks have a certified external audit and if the 
10 largest banks are rated by international and domestic credit rating agencies. The index also 
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considers bank regulations relating to explicit deposit insurance, the compensation to 
customers in the case of bankruptcy, and bank accounting in terms of unpaid interest, non-
performing loans, and consolidated financial statements. This index can take values between 0 
and 12 with higher values representing a higher level of private monitoring.  
Activities Restrictions (RES): This index measures the extent to which bank regulations restrict 
banks from engaging in securities, insurance, and real estate activities. In particular, the index 
considers securities activities in terms of securities underwriting, brokerage, and dealing. 
Insurance activities refer to the extent to which banks may underwrite and sell insurance. 
Finally, real estate activities refer to the extent to which banks could engage in real estate 
investment, development, and management.  This index ranges from 3-12 with higher values 
denoting restrictions that are more stringent. 
In Table 1 we provide more detailed and technical definitions of the bank regulation and 
supervision indices, as well as details for the other variables we use in this study. 
Table 1 
3.1.4 Institutional quality 
We source the political stability, control of corruption and the rule of law indicators from the 
Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) project of the World Bank. The definitions of these 
institutional quality variables are the following:  
Political stability (POL):  It measures perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be 
destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including politically 
motivated violence and terrorism. The values of this index range from -2.5 to +2.5 with higher 
values implying a more stable political environment. 
Control of corruption (COR): This is a measure of the perceptions of the extent to which public 
power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption. The 
index ranges from -2.5 to +2.5 with higher values implying better control of corruption. 
Rule of law (RL): This index refers to the perceptions of the extent to which agents have 
confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract 
enforcement, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence. The 
rule of law index ranges from -2.5 to +2.5 with higher value implying stronger rule of law. 
Furthermore, we source the creditor rights (CR) and information sharing (IS) indices from the 
Doing Business project of the World Bank. The creditor rights index measures the extent to 
which collateral and bankruptcy legislation defends the rights of lenders. This index ranges 
from 0 to 10 with higher values implying stronger creditor protection. The information sharing 
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index measures rules and practices affecting the coverage, scope, and accessibility of credit 
information available through either a credit bureau or a credit registry. The range of this index 
is from 0 to 6 with higher values denoting a higher availability of credit information. 
 
3.1.5 Control variables 
We also employ several control variables that we draw from the bank stability literature. In 
terms of bank-specific controls, we use the natural logarithm of total assets (lnTA) to proxy for 
bank size and the ratio of loan loss provisions over total loans (LPPL) as a proxy for the quality 
of the loan portfolio (Barakat and Hussainey, 2013). We also employ the ratio of equity to total 
assets  (EQAS) to control for the monitoring of the management from the equity holders and 
the loan to assets ratio (LOAN) to capture the asset side of the balance sheet (Beltratti and 
Stulz, 2012; Barth et al., 2013). Finally, to control for bank growth we follow Demirguc Kunt 
and Huizinga (2010) and use the real (i.e. inflation-adjusted) growth rate of a bank’s assets 
(ASTGR). We source the bank-specific variables from Bankscope.  
In terms of country-level controls, we employ both bank industry and macroeconomic 
variables. In order to proxy for bank industry concentration, we use loan data and measure the 
Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI). We use the following equation to estimate the HHI index: 
 = ∑ ()


 . In this equation, MS is the loan market share of the  bank and  is the 
number of banks in a market (i.e. country). Thus, the HHI index places emphasis on banks with 
higher market share by assigning greater weight on them compared to banks with lower market 
share. Furthermore, to proxy for the corporate governance quality of a country’s banks we 
employ the corporate board efficacy indicator (CGOV) that we source from the Global 
Competitiveness Report of the World Economic Forum (WEF). This indicator ranges from 1 to 
7 with higher values denoting a higher representation of outside shareholders and investors on 
the board. Higher board efficacy could improve bank stability because outside shareholders and 
investors may alleviate the opportunistic behaviour of bank managers. With respect to 
macroeconomic control variables, we employ the inflation rate (INF) as a proxy for monetary 
instability (Beck et al., 2006) and the GDP growth rate as a proxy for fluctuations in the 
economic activity (Agoraki et al., 2011). Furthermore, we use the natural logarithm of GDP per 
capita (GDPC) in purchasing power parity (PPP) terms to measure the overall level of 
economic development (Barth et al., 2013). We source the macroeconomic variables from the 
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World Development Indicators (WDI) database of the World Bank. In Table 2 we provide some 
summary statistics of the variables we use in the study9. 
Table 2 
 
3.2 Methods 
There are two important concerns that we need to take into account before selecting an 
appropriate identification strategy. The first is the potential persistence of bank stability 
(Agoraki et al., 2011). The second is the potential endogeneity of bank stability with the bank-
specific and the bank regulation and supervision variables (Delis and Staikouras, 2011).  For 
these two reasons, we opt to estimate dynamic panel models using the two-step system 
generalized method of moments  (GMM) estimator as advanced by Arellano and Bover (1995) 
and Blundell and Bond (1998)  with robust standard errors (Windmeijer, 2005).  More 
specifically, we provide estimations of the following model (1):  
lnZ-SCOREi,t = α0 + β1lnZ-SCOREi,t-1 +  β2REG,j,t + β3 INST,j,t + β4 REGj,t x INSTj,t  + β5BANKi,t   
+ β6COUNTRYj,t   + θj +  λt  + µi  + εi,t                                                                                                                               (1) 
In equation (1), i, j, t stand for bank, country and year respectively. The variable lnZ-SCOREi,t 
stands for the natural logarithm of the bank stability measure while REGj,t stands for the vector 
of bank regulation and supervision variables. Furthermore, INSTj,t stands for the vector of 
institutional quality variables. Additionally, BANKi,t   stands for the vector of the bank-specific 
control variables and COUNTRYj,t   is a vector of the country-specific control variables. Finally, 
θj represents country effects, λt is a set of year effects, µi is a bank-specific effect and εi,t is the 
error term.  
The inclusion of the lagged dependent variable as an explanatory variable in the equation (1) 
accounts for the potential persistence of bank stability. Another virtue of the two-step system 
GMM estimator is that we can treat some of the explanatory variables as endogenous with the 
use of appropriate instruments. In our estimations we treat as endogenous the lagged dependent 
variable, lnZ-SCOREi,t-1 , as it is the standard in the literature. Furthermore, we follow previous 
empirical research (Delis and Staikouras, 2011, Delis 2012)10 and treat as endogenous the bank 
regulation variables (activities restrictions, capital requirements regulation, supervisory power, 
and private monitoring) as well as the bank-specific controls (size, the loan to assets ratio, the 
                                                          
9
 A correlation matrix of the variables of the study is available in Table A2 of the appendix. 
10
 Delis and Staikouras (2011) provide a detailed discussion on the issue of endogeneity between bank stability 
and bank regulation. In short, regulators could be motivated to change bank regulation and supervision when they 
observe excessive risks in the banking sector.  
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equity to assets ratio, the loan loss provisions to assets ratio and bank asset growth). We also 
treat as endogenous some country-level controls that relate to the banking sector. Specifically, 
we treat as endogenous the creditor rights and the credit information-sharing indices11 as well 
as the bank industry concentration (HHI) and the corporate governance quality (CGOV) 
measures. Treating the above variables as endogenous suggests that we can use their second 
and longer lags as instruments (Blundell and Bond, 1998; Bond, 2002).   
Finally, we treat the rest of the institutional quality variables (political stability, control of 
corruption and the rule of law) and the macroeconomic controls (inflation, GDP growth and 
GDP per capita) as predetermined (Delis and Staikouras, 2011, Delis, 2012).  This means that 
banks note the state of the economy and institutional quality in each year period and adjust 
their strategy accordingly. For the variables that enter the dynamic panel models as 
predetermined their first and longer lags can be used as instruments.  The results of the two-
step system GMM estimator are verified by Hansen’s J test for instrument validity and the 
second-order autocorrelation of the error terms test, AR2, as introduced by Arellano and Bond 
(1991).   
 
4. Empirical Findings and Discussion 
4.1 Main Empirical Findings 
4.1.1 Capital Regulation and Institutional Quality 
The models 1-5 of Table 3 provide the results of the dynamic panel estimations that relate to 
the conditioning effect of institutional quality on the relationship between capital regulation 
and bank stability12. 
Table 3 
These models show that the lag of the dependent variable, the natural log of the z-score, carries 
a positive and significant at the 1% level coefficient. This denotes the persistence of bank 
stability and justifies the use of dynamic panel analysis in this study. In models 1-5 of Table 3, 
we find that the individual effect of stringent capital regulation (CS) on bank stability is 
positive and in some cases also significant at conventional statistical levels. This result is in 
                                                          
11
 Although creditor rights and credit information sharing are not bank regulation and supervision variables, they 
are still largely specific to the banking sector and could be endogenous with measures of bank stability and 
performance. For example, banks may decide, in order to improve their performance and stability, to increase 
credit information sharing through private credit bureaus. There is a stream in the literature that explains how 
credit information sharing could arise endogenously (see e.g. Padilla and Pagano, 1997). 
12
 Some observations are lost from the total sample because of the availability of some of the right hand-side 
variables and the use of lagged values in the dynamic panel models. 
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line with studies that find that capital regulation, by increasing the loss absorption capacity of 
banks, decreases bank risk (Agoraki et al., 2011; Tan and Floros, 2013).  
Concerning the conditioning effects of institutional quality, we find in model 1 of Table 3 that 
the interaction term between capital requirements regulation (CS) and political stability (PS) is 
positive and significant at the 1% level. Hence, the positive effect of capital regulation on bank 
stability strengthens at higher levels of political stability. This suggests a complementary 
relationship between institutional quality in terms of political stability and bank regulation in 
terms of capital stringency. Therefore, this finding provides empirical evidence in support of 
the H.1 “institutional quality-regulation enforcement” hypothesis. Political stability could 
induce the enforcement of regulations through ensuring the consistency and the implementation 
capacity of the regulatory mechanisms (Roe and Siegel, 2011). However, the other two 
institutional quality characteristics that could be relevant to the H.1 “institutional quality-
regulation enforcement” hypothesis, the control of corruption (CCOR) and the rule law (RL), 
do not interact significantly with the capital regulation (CS) variable (see models 2 and 3 of 
Table 3).  A potential explanation is that the control of corruption and the rule of law could 
function also as substitutes of capital regulation by improving lending efficiency and the 
probability of loan repayment (Laeven and Majnoni, 2005; Bae and Goyal, 2009). Therefore, 
the role that these two institutional characteristics play in the “institutional quality-loan 
repayment” channel could neutralise their potential beneficial effect on bank regulation 
enforcement, through the “institutional quality-regulation enforcement channel”, and vice-
versa.  
Turning to the interaction term of capital regulation (CS) with creditor rights (CR), we find that 
it enters model 4 of Table 3 with a negative and significant, at the 1% level, coefficient. This 
suggests that the positive individual effect of stringent capital regulation (CS) on bank stability 
subdues at higher levels of creditor rights (CR). This finding implies a substitution relationship 
between capital regulation (CS) and creditor rights (CR). Thus, this result is consistent with 
hypothesis H.2, which posits that institutional quality could moderate the individual effect of 
bank regulation on bank stability.  In line with the “institutional quality-loan repayment” view, 
when banks can grab collateral in case of loan defaults and thus can limit their losses, then the 
importance of the loss-absorbing capacity of banks due to stringent capital regulation subdues. 
Finally, in model 5 of Table 3, the coefficient of the interaction between information sharing 
(IS) and capital regulation (CS) is not significantly different from zero.  
4.1.2 Supervisory Power and Institutional Quality 
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The models 6-10 of Table 3 provide the findings of the interaction terms between official 
supervisory power (OP) and the institutional quality characteristics. These models show that 
the individual effect of official supervisory power (OP) on bank stability is negative while it is 
also significant in some models. A potential reason for this negative association is that a strong 
supervisor could force banks to allocate credit for private gain and/or political purposes. This 
weak integrity in the lending process could decrease bank stability due to lower asset quality 
(Beltratti and Stulz, 2012).  Overall, the finding that supervisory power (OP) decreases bank 
stability conforms to the “private interest view” of bank regulation and supervision (Barth et 
al, 2008).  
Regarding the conditioning effects of institutional quality, we find in model 7 of Table 3 that 
the interaction term between official supervisory power (OS) and control of corruption 
(CCOR) is positive and significant. This finding provides some evidence that the negative 
effect of supervisory power (OP) on stability weakens at higher levels of control of corruption. 
Control of corruption could limit the room of maneuver that strong supervisors have in order to 
influence bank credit allocation for private gain. This could strengthen lending integrity, lead to 
better asset quality and improve bank stability through a higher probability of loan repayment. 
Thus, the weakening of the negative effect of supervisory power (OP) on stability in the 
presence of higher control of corruption (CCOR) provides some evidence in support to the H.2 
“institutional quality-loan repayment” hypothesis. It is important to note though that this 
evidence is statistically weak as the interaction term between supervisory power (OP) and 
control of corruption (CCOR) is significant at the 10% level. 
Moreover, the interaction terms between official supervisory power (OP) and the rest of the 
institutional quality variables enter models 6-10 of Table 3 with coefficients not significantly 
different from zero. This suggests that we do not find strong evidence that institutional quality 
exert a significant conditioning effect on the negative impact of effect of supervisory power on 
bank stability. The study of Agarwal et al. (2014) provides a potential explanation for this 
finding. The authors focus on the United States and provide evidence that state bank 
supervisors, in comparison with their federal counterparts, show more leniency in the 
supervision process.  This leniency contributes to higher bank failure probabilities and lower 
repayment rates. More importantly, the authors show that the source of such leniency is not the 
institutional quality of the states’ public sector but the comparatively limited access of the state 
supervisors to regulatory resources such as budgeting, staffing, and training. Similarly, in the 
context of emerging markets, the negative effect of supervisory power on bank stability could 
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relate more to a limited availability of regulatory resources and less to institutional quality 
characteristics.  
4.1.3 Private Monitoring and Institutional Quality 
The models 1-5 of Table 4 provide the results of the dynamic panel estimations that relate to 
the conditioning effect of institutional quality on the relationship between private monitoring 
and bank stability.  
Table 4 
In these models, we find that the individual effect of private monitoring (PM) on bank stability 
is positive and statistically significant in some cases (see models 3 and 5 of Table 4).  This 
finding is consistent with previous studies (e.g. Hoque et al., 2015). One channel through 
which private monitoring regulation could have a beneficial effect on bank stability is the 
disclosure of accurate information to the public, which would enable private agents to monitor 
banks more effectively (Hay and Shleifer, 1998). Through another channel, the absence of 
explicit deposit insurance, which is an important aspect of stringent private monitoring 
regulation, could motivate depositors to monitor banks intensively and discourage them from 
engaging in risky activities (Akins et al., 2016).  
As far as concerns the conditioning effects of institutional quality, we find in model 3 of Table 
4 that the interaction term between private monitoring (PM) and the rule of law (RL) is 
negative and significant at the 5% level. The positive individual effect of private monitoring on 
bank stability subdues at higher levels of rule of law.  This finding denotes a substitution 
relationship between private monitoring regulation and the rule of law concerning their effect 
on bank stability. Similarly, the interaction term between private monitoring (PM) and creditor 
rights (CR) enters model 4 of Table 4 with a negative and significant, at the 10% level, 
coefficient. In combination, the latter two findings suggest that the positive effect of private 
monitoring on bank stability weakens in the presence of efficient institutional mechanisms that 
increase the probability of loan repayment.  Thus, an efficient judiciary and legislation that 
protects lenders, render private monitoring less beneficial to bank stability. This is consistent 
with the H.2 “institutional quality-loan repayment” hypothesis.  This finding also means that 
private monitoring is more beneficial to bank stability in an environment that the loan 
repayment institutional mechanisms are weak and uncertain. In such an environment, the 
higher disclosure and the improvement in the integrity of bank lending and corporate 
governance that private monitoring induces (Beck et al., 2006; Barth et al., 2008) become of 
particular importance for bank stability.  
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It is noteworthy that the interaction terms between some institutional characteristics that are 
highly relevant to the capacity of a country’s public sector (political stability and control of 
corruption) do not interact significantly with private monitoring (see models 1 and 2 of Table 
4). A potential reason could be that most of the components of the private monitoring index 
either represent private sector measures (e.g. rating of banks from international rating agencies) 
or require the absence of public sector involvement (e.g. no deposit insurance scheme). This 
finding conforms to the view that one of the reasons that regulation that induces private 
monitoring could be efficient in promoting bank stability is that it can avoid hurdles stemming 
from shortcomings in the operations of the public sector (Shleifer and Vishny, 1998).  
 
4.1.4 Activities Restrictions and Institutional Quality 
The models 6-10 of Table 4 depict the results of the dynamic panel estimations relevant to the 
conditioning effect of institutional quality on the relationship between activities restrictions and 
bank stability. In these models, the effect of activities restrictions (RES) on bank stability is 
positive and significant. This finding, consistent with some previous studies (e.g. Agoraki et 
al., 2011; Hoque et al., 2015), denotes that activities restrictions could prevent banks from 
engaging in risky non-interest based activities and thus could be conducive to bank stability.  
The interaction terms in models 6-10 of Table 4 reveal that some institutional quality 
characteristics enhance significantly the positive effect of activities restrictions on bank 
stability. This means that institutional quality has a complementary relationship with activities 
restrictions. In models 6, 7 and 8 of Table 4, the interaction terms between activities restriction 
(RES) and political stability (PS), activities restriction (RES) and control of corruption 
(CCOR), and activities restriction (RES) and the rule of law (RL) are positive and significant at 
the 1% level respectively. The interpretation of these findings has two aspects. The first is that 
these results are consistent with the H.1 “institutional quality-regulation enforcement” 
hypothesis. A higher level of political stability, control of corruption and rule of law could 
empower regulators to enforce activities restrictions. The second is that activities restrictions, 
by inducing banks to focus on the interest-based loan market, render institutional 
characteristics that increase the probability of loan repayment complements to the positive 
effect that such regulation exerts on bank stability.  This conforms to the “institutional quality-
loan repayment” view as reflected in the customised for activities restrictions hypothesis H.3. 
Institutional quality in terms of political stability, control of corruption and the rule of law, 
could increase the probability of loan repayment by improving the lending terms (Bae and 
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Goyal, 2009) and by empowering the mechanisms that enforce loan repayment such as the 
judicial system (Schiantarelli et al., 2016).  
We find less strong evidence that creditor rights and information sharing condition the positive 
effect of activities restriction on bank stability. The interaction term between activities 
restrictions (RES) and information sharing (IS) is positive and significant at the 5% level (see 
model 10 of Table 4), while the interaction between activities restrictions (RES) and creditor 
rights (CR) does not carry a significant coefficient (see model 9 of Table 4). A potential reason 
that creditor rights and information sharing do not interact as significantly with activities 
restrictions as political stability, control of corruption and the rule of law do, stems from the 
different attributes of these two types of institutional characteristics. Creditor rights and 
information sharing are institutional arrangements with the sole purpose of increasing the 
efficiency of the lending market. Therefore, creditor rights and information sharing do not 
relate to regulation enforcement and therefore could condition the positive effect of activities 
restriction on bank stability only through the “institutional quality-loan repayment” (H.3) 
channel. On the other hand, political stability, control of corruption and the rule of law could 
complement the positive effect of activities restrictions on bank stability both through the 
“institutional quality-regulation enforcement” (H.1) and the “institutional quality-loan 
repayment” (H.3) channel. Nevertheless, it is worth mentioning that the restriction on bank 
activities is the only type of bank regulation in this study that interacts significantly with the 
information sharing variable. The findings in model 10 of Table 4 suggest that information 
sharing enhances the positive effect of activities restrictions on bank stability. Regulation that 
restricts bank activities forces banks to increase their focus on the traditional loan market. 
Therefore, banks in the presence of stringent activities restrictions face a wide pool of potential 
borrowers. In such an environment, information sharing, by providing rich information on 
these potential borrowers, becomes an essential tool that banks can use in order to reduce 
adverse selection and borrower moral hazard (Houston et al., 2010; Dierkes et al., 2013).  
4.1.5 The individual effect of institutional quality and the effect of the control variables 
Overall, we find that the individual effect of political stability (PS) on bank stability is positive 
and in some cases significant. This finding is in line with Ghosh (2016) who shows that the 
recent political turmoil in the Middle East due to the “Arab spring” had a detrimental effect on 
bank stability. Similarly, we find that the association of the rule of law (RL) with bank stability 
is positive and significant. Somewhat surprisingly, most models in Tables 3 and 4 show that 
the individual effect of control of corruption (CCOR) on bank stability is negative and 
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significant. In the context of emerging markets, higher corruption could enable the most 
productive firms to access loans in better terms (Chen et al., 2013)13.  Furthermore, Mendoza et 
al. (2015) provide evidence that corruption, in some cases, allows firms from emerging markets 
to improve their performance by enabling them to avoid excessive bureaucracy. Therefore, 
corruption, in the emerging markets context, could have a positive effect on bank stability by 
“greasing the wheels” of lending and improving the performance of borrowing firms. The 
individual effect of creditor rights (CR) on stability is negative and significant in most models 
of Tables 3, and 4. This result in line with the findings of Houston et al. (2010) and suggests 
that strong creditor rights could decrease bank stability by inducing banks to rely heavily on 
collateral and relax their lending standards.  Finally, we find that information sharing (IS) 
exerts a positive effect on stability. This finding is consistent with previous studies (e.g. 
Houston et al., 2010) and underlines the importance of credit registries in reducing information 
asymmetry issues in the credit market.  
Concerning the country-level controls, the effect of GDP growth (GDPG) on bank stability is 
positive and significant in most models. A growing economy generates higher and more stable 
returns that could enhance bank stability. The country-level corporate governance measure 
(CGOV) also exerts a positive and significant effect on bank stability. Banks located in 
countries where their management teams are highly accountable to investors enjoy higher 
levels of stability. We also find that bank stability has a positive and significant association 
with the level of economic development (lnGDPcap) whilst its relationship with inflation (INF) 
is also significant but negative.  
Finally, the effects of the bank-specific controls on stability are broadly consistent in all 
estimations of Tables 3 and 4. We find that size (lnTA) exerts a positive and significant effect 
on bank stability. Larger banks could be more stable due to benefits stemming from economies 
of scale and scope. The effect of the intermediation ratio (LOAN) on bank stability is also 
positive and significant in most specifications. Beltratti and Stulz (2012) find that banks with 
high levels of bank loans have a smaller portfolio of risky securities and thus are more stable. 
We also find that the loan loss provisions to assets ratio (LLPL) and the equity to assets ratio 
(EQAS) exert, in most models, a significant effect on stability, which is negative and positive 
respectively. In addition, most models of Tables 3 and 4 show that bank asset growth (ASTGR) 
                                                          
13
 The study of Chen et al., (2013) provides empirical evidence from the loan market of China that although 
bribery is not sufficient for obtaining a loan, it enables the most productive firms to obtain loans with better terms. 
Therefore, corruption “greases the wheels” of lending but only for the best performing firms. 
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has a negative and significant association with stability. These findings are in line with 
previous empirical research (e.g. Anginer et al., 2014).  
 
4.2 Further Analysis and Robustness Checks  
4.2.1 Further Analysis: Z-score Disaggregation 
To enhance the main analysis we follow previous studies (e.g. Houston et al., 2010; Beck et al., 
2013) and estimate models that use the three components of the z-score (ROA, the standard 
deviation of ROA and the bank capital ratio) as separate dependent variables. This exercise 
enables us to examine if the interaction between institutional quality and bank regulation and 
supervision exerts an impact on bank stability by affecting the risk and the profitability of bank 
assets or by merely influencing bank capital.  
In this further analysis, we focus on the most significant findings of Tables 3 and 4 (i.e. on the 
interactions between institutional quality and regulations with a significance level of 1% or 
5%). The models that employ as dependent variables the three different components of the z-
score are available in Table 5. Note that we use the negative of profit volatility (standard 
deviation of ROA) such that an increase would denote higher profit stability. Overall, we find 
that the interactions between institutional quality and bank regulations and supervision affect 
bank stability more through their effect on profit stability (-lnSDROA) and profitability (ROA) 
rather than through their effect on bank capital (EQAS).  
Table 5 
The first three models of Table 5 show that the interaction between capital regulation (CS) and 
political stability (PS) exerts a positive and significant effect on all the three z-score 
components while in these models the individual effect of capital regulation (CS) carries a 
positive coefficient. These findings suggest that higher political stability enhances the positive 
effect of capital regulation on bank stability both by improving profit stability (-lnSDROA) and 
profitability (ROA) and by increasing capital ratios (EQAS).  These results corroborate the 
findings of the main analysis and lend further support to the H.1 “institutional quality-
regulation enforcement” hypothesis about the interaction between capital regulation and 
political stability.  The models 3-6 of Table 5 repeat this exercise for the interaction between 
capital regulation (CS) and creditor rights (CR). We find that this interaction exerts a negative 
and significant effect on profit stability (see model 4 of Table 5). Therefore, the positive 
individual effect of capital regulation on profit stability weakens in the presence of stronger 
creditor rights. This finding further corroborates the results of the main analysis that show a 
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substitution relationship between capital regulation and creditor rights which is consistent with 
the H.2 “institutional quality-loan repayment hypothesis”. 
The models 7-9 of Table 5 show the effect of the interaction term between private monitoring 
(PM) and the rule of law (RL) on the three z-score components. The coefficient of this 
interaction carries a negative sign in all these three models but is significant, at the 10% level, 
only in model 7 when the dependent variable is profit stability (-lnSDROA). Furthermore, the 
individual effect of private monitoring (PM) on profit stability is positive and significant at the 
5% level. Thus, the positive effect of private monitoring on bank profit stability subdues at a 
higher level of rule of law. This result is in line with the findings of the main analysis and lends 
additional support to the H.2 “institutional quality-loan repayment” hypothesis concerning 
private monitoring and the rule of law. 
The rest of the models of Table 5 (models 10-21) show the effect of the interaction terms 
between activities restrictions (RES) and institutional quality (political stability, control of 
corruption, the rule of law, and information sharing) on the components of z-score. These 
interaction terms are generally positive and significant in the models that the dependent 
variables are the profit stability (-lnSDROA) indicator (see models 13, 16 and 19 of Table 5) 
and the profitability (ROA) measure (see models 11, 14 and 17 of Table 5). These findings 
suggest that the positive effect of activities restrictions on bank profit stability and profitability 
strengthens in the presence of higher institutional quality. Thus, activities restrictions and 
institutional quality are complements concerning their effect on the bank profit stability and 
profitability. These findings are consistent with the results of the main analysis and provide 
further evidence in support of the H.1 “institutional quality-regulation enforcement” 
hypothesis and the customized for activities restrictions H.3 “institutional quality-loan 
repayment”   hypothesis. 
 
4.2.2 Robustness Checks: Alternative Measures of Institutional Quality and Principal 
Component Analysis 
To check the robustness of the empirical findings in the main analysis, we first estimate models 
that use alternative measures of institutional quality. In this robustness exercise, we focus again 
on the most significant findings of Tables 3 and 4 (i.e. on the interactions between institutional 
quality and regulations with a significance level of 1% or 5%). 
We source the government integrity index (GI) from the Heritage Foundation as an alternative 
measure of control of corruption. This index ranges from 0 to 100 with higher values denoting 
less corruption. Next, we employ the political rights index (PR) from Freedom House as a 
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proxy for political stability14. This index ranges from 1 to 7 while it is important to note that 
lower values of this index indicate a higher level of political rights. To proxy for the rule of 
law, we use the strength of the legal structure (LS) index that we source from the Fraser Index 
of Economic Freedom.  The legal structure index is the average figure of three sub-indices: the 
integrity of the legal system, the legal enforcement of contracts and the reliability of law 
enforcement agencies. This index ranges from 0-10 with higher values denoting a stronger 
legal structure. Finally, as an alternative measure of creditor rights (CR), we use the property 
rights (PROP) index that we source from the Heritage Foundation.  This index measures the 
extent to which the country’s laws protect private property rights and ranges from 0 to 100.  
The results of the dynamic panel estimations that employ these alternative measures of 
institutional quality are available in models 1-6 of Table 615. These are broadly consistent with 
the findings of the main analysis.  
Table 6 
The interaction between capital requirements regulation (CS) and political rights (PR) is 
negative and significant at the 5% level while the individual effect of stringent capital 
regulation (CS) on bank stability is positive  (see model 1 of Table 6). Note that higher values 
of the political rights index (PR) imply weaker political rights. Therefore, the positive effect of 
capital regulation (CS) on bank stability subdues when political rights are weak. This result 
further supports the finding of the main analysis that capital regulation and political stability 
are complements concerning their effect on bank stability in support of the H.1 “institutional 
quality-regulation enforcement” hypothesis. About private monitoring (PM) we find that its 
interaction term with legal structure (LS) is negative and significant at the 1% level (see model 
3 of Table 6). The positive effect of private monitoring on bank stability weakens in the 
presence of institutional mechanisms that increase the probability of loan repayment in line 
with the “institutional quality-loan repayment” view of hypothesis H.2. Finally, we find that 
the positive effect of activities restrictions (RES) on bank stability strengthens in the presence 
of government integrity (GI)  and a strong legal structure (LS) while it subdues in the presence 
                                                          
14
 The political rights index from the Freedom House encompasses political rights and civil liberties. Political 
rights measure the level of political party competition, actual rule, real power of political parties and the presence 
of minority groups in politics, while civil liberties measure the degree to which freedom of expression assembly, 
education and religion is expressed. Although an imperfect alternative measure of political stability, political 
rights relates closely to political stability (Roe and Siegel, 2011). For example, Acemoglu et al. (2008) provide 
evidence that political rights decrease social unrest, which could contribute to political stability.  
15
 Note that we cannot perform this exercise for information sharing. This is because there is no alternative cross-
country dataset for this variable except the World Bank dataset that we use in the main analysis. 
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of limited political rights as proxied by the PR variable (see models 5, 6 and 4 of Table 6 
respectively).  
As a second robustness check, we employ principal component analysis to turn the four bank 
regulation and supervision variables (CS, OP, PM, RES) into a single bank regulation and 
supervision variable (REG). Furthermore, using principal component analysis we also turn the 
institutional quality characteristics into two variables (IQ and CRIS). IQ is the principal 
component of control of corruption (COR), political stability (POL) and the rule of law (RL), 
while CRIS is the principal component of creditor rights (CR) and information sharing (IS). 
The results of the estimations that use the principal component variables are available in 
models 7 and 8 of Table 6.  
In model 7 of Table 6, we find that the interaction term between the bank regulation and 
supervision variable (REG) and institutional quality (IQ) in terms of the principal component 
of political stability, control of corruption and the rule of law is positive and significant at the 
5% level. This means that the positive individual effect of bank regulation and supervision on 
bank stability strengthens at higher levels of institutional quality in terms of political stability, 
control of corruption and the rule of law. This finding provides further evidence in support of 
the H.1 “institutional quality-regulation enforcement” hypothesis. On the other hand, the 
interaction between the bank regulation and supervision variable (REG) and the principal 
component of creditor rights and information sharing (CRIS) is negative but not significant 
(see model 8 of Table 6). This provides only some tentative empirical support to the 
H.2“institutional quality-loan repayment” hypothesis in terms of creditor rights and 
information sharing. The latter finding highlights the importance of using disaggregated 
measures of institutional quality and bank regulations in order to obtain a more meaningful set 
of empirical results.  
 
6. Conclusion 
This study examines if institutional quality conditions the impact of bank regulations and 
supervision on bank stability, as measured by the z-score, in emerging and developing 
economies over the 2004-2013 period.  We provide evidence of the existence of such 
conditioning effects but these depend on the type of institutional quality and on the type of 
bank regulation.  
The empirical findings show that political stability and control of corruption tend to exhibit a 
complementary relationship with some bank regulations concerning the effect of the latter on 
bank stability. We find that political stability enhances the positive effect of capital regulations 
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and activities restrictions on bank stability. Moreover, the positive effect of activities 
restrictions on bank stability also strengthens at higher levels of control of corruption. These 
results are in line with the “institutional quality-regulation enforcement” hypothesis, which 
posits that good institutions induce regulatory enforcement. On the contrary, we find that 
institutional quality characteristics that facilitate loan repayment tend to display a substitution 
relationship with bank regulations. The positive effect of capital regulation on bank stability 
weakens in the presence of higher levels of rule of law and strong creditor rights. Furthermore, 
the positive effect of private monitoring on bank stability also subdues when the rule of law is 
prevalent. The latter findings are consistent with the “institutional quality-loan repayment” 
hypothesis. However, we do not find strong evidence that the negative effect of supervisory 
power on bank stability is conditioned by institutional quality. In further analysis, we 
decompose the z-score measure and find that institutional quality conditions the effect of bank 
regulations on stability more though influencing profit volatility and profitability rather than by 
affecting bank capital.  
Overall, taking into account the interactions between bank regulations and institutional quality 
leads to an improved understanding of the institutional framework in which specific bank 
regulations could be more effective in promoting bank stability. Hence, this study provides 
some policy implications that could be useful in the light of the full implementation of Basel III 
in 2019. Firstly, political stability could be a prerequisite for capital regulation and activities 
restrictions to reach their full potential in terms of their beneficial effect on bank stability. 
Thus, political risk, that is still pervasive in many emerging and developing economies, could 
limit the effectiveness of such bank regulations. Secondly, capital regulation and private 
monitoring could be particularly useful for bank stability in emerging and developing 
economies with weak judicial efficiency (i.e. rule of law) and creditor rights. Given that legal 
systems are persistent to change, the adoption of more stringent capital regulation and 
regulation that induces private monitoring in such countries could promote bank stability. 
Finally, the absence of strong evidence that institutional quality conditions the negative effect 
of supervisory power on bank stability denotes that a potential source of this negative 
association could be the lack of access to regulatory resources and staff training.   
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Tables and Figures 
Table 1: Variable definitions and sources 
Variables Definition Sources 
Bank Stability   
lnZ-score
 
The natural logarithm of (ROA+EQAS)/SDROA, where EQAS is the capital to 
assets ratio, and SDROA is standard deviation of return on assets, and ROA is return 
on assets. A higher Z-score indicates a higher level of bank stability, while a lower 
value of Z-score indicates a higher level of insolvency risk. 
BankScope 
Bank regulations  
Official Supervisory 
power 
Measure the degree to which country’s bank supervisory agency has the authority to 
take specific actions. It is composed of the answers from specific survey questions: 
(1) Does the supervisory agency have the right to meet the external auditors about 
banks? (2) Are auditors required to communicate directly to the supervisory agency 
about elicit activities, fraud, or insider abuse? (3) Can supervisors take legal action 
against external auditors for negligence? (4) Can the supervisory authority force a 
bank to change its internal organization structure? (5) Are off-balance sheet items 
disclosed to supervisors? (6) Can the supervisory agency order the bank’s directors 
or management to constitute provision to cover actual or potential losses? (7) Can the 
supervisory agency suspend the directors’ decision to distribute (a) dividends, (b) 
bonuses, and (c) management fees? (8) Can the supervisory agency supersede the 
rights of bank shareholders and declare a bank insolvent? (9) Can the supervisory 
agency suspend some or all ownership rights? (1) Can the supervisory agency (a) 
supersede shareholder rights, (b) remove and replace management, and (c) remove 
and replace directors? The official supervisory index has a maximum value of 14 and 
a minimum value of 0, where larger numbers indicate greater power. 
Bank Regulation 
and Supervision 
Database, World 
Bank; Barth et al. 
(2013) 
Capital Regulation Measure the amount of capital banks must hold and the stringency of regulation on Bank Regulation 
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the nature and source of regulatory capital. It is composed of the answers from 
specific survey questions: (1) Is the capital-asset ratio risk weighted in line with the 
Basel I guidelines? (2) Does the minimum capital-asset ratio vary as a function of an 
individual bank’s credit risk? (3) Does the minimum capital-asset ratio vary as a 
function of market risk? (4) Before minimum capital adequacy is determined, which 
of the following are deducted from the book value of capital? Market value of loan 
losses not realized in accounting book? Unrealized losses in securities portfolios? Or 
unrealized foreign exchange losses? (5) What fraction of revaluation gains is allowed 
as part of capital? (6) Are the sources of funds to be used as capital verified by the 
regulatory/supervisory authorities? (7) Can the initial disbursement or subsequent 
injections of capita; be done with assets other than cash or government securities? 
And (8) Can initial disbursement of capital be done with borrowed funds? Larger 
values of this index of bank capital regulation indicate more stringent capital 
regulation. The maximum possible value is 10, while the minimum possible value is 
0. 
 
and Supervision 
Database, World 
Bank; Barth et al. 
(2013) 
Activities restrictions Measure the degree to which national regulations restrict banks from engaging in (1) 
securities activities, (2) insurance activities, and (3) real estate activities. More 
specifically, securities activities refer to securities underwriting, brokering, dealing, 
and all aspects of the mutual fund industry. Insurance activities involve insurance 
underwriting and selling. And real estate activities refer to real estate investment, 
development, and management. The index values for securities, insurance, and real 
estate range from 1 to 4, where larger values indicate more restrictions on banks 
performing each activity. In particular, 4 signifies prohibited, 3 indicates that there 
are tight restrictions on the provision of the activity, 2 means that the activity is 
permitted but with some limits, and 1 signals that the activity is permitted. The index 
ranges from 3 to 12 with higher values denoting more restrictions. 
Bank Regulation 
and Supervision 
Database, World 
Bank; Barth et al. 
(2013) 
Private monitoring Measure the degree to which regulatory and supervisory policies encourage the 
private monitoring of banks that builds on an array of individual questions contained 
in the survey. Specifically, the private monitoring index is composed of information 
on (1) whether bank directors and officials are legally liable for the accuracy of 
information disclosed to the public, (2) whether banks must publish consolidated 
accounts, (3) whether banks must be audited by certified international auditors, (4) 
whether 100 percent of the largest 10 banks are rated by international rating 
agencies, (5) whether off-balance sheet items are disclosed to the public, (6) whether 
banks must disclose their risk management procedures to the public, (7) whether 
accrued, though unpaid interest/principal, enter the income statement while the loan 
is still non-performing, (8) whether subordinated debt is allowable as part of capital, 
and (9) whether there is no explicit deposit insurance system and no insurance was 
paid the last time a bank failed. Thus, the maximum value of the private monitoring 
index is 12 and the minimum value is 0, where larger values indicate greater 
regulatory empowerment of the monitoring of banks by private investors. 
Bank Regulation 
and Supervision 
Database, World 
Bank; Barth et al. 
(2013) 
Institutional Quality Characteristics 
Control of corruption The extent to which public power is exercised for private gain. Range -2.5 to +2.5. World 
Governance 
Indicators 
Rule of law The extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society.  
Range -2.5 to +2.5. 
World 
Governance 
Indicators 
Political stability The likelihood that the government will be destabilized or overthrown by 
unconstitutional or violent means. Range -2.5 to +2.5. 
World 
Governance 
Indicators 
Creditor rights The degree to which collateral and bankruptcy laws protect the rights of borrowers 
and lenders and thus facilitate lending. Range 0-10. 
Doing Business 
Information sharing Rules and practices affecting the coverage, scope and accessibility of credit 
information available. Range 0-6. 
Doing Business 
Control variables   
lnTA Natural logarithm of total assets BankScope 
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LLPL Loan loss provision to total loans BankScope 
EQAS Bank equity to total assets BankScope 
LOAN 
ASTGR 
CGOV 
 
 
HHI 
The ratio of loans to total assets.  
Real growth rate of bank assets (inflation adjusted). 
Corporate board efficacy indicator. Range 1-7. Higher values denote that managers 
are more accountable to outside shareholders and investors. 
 
Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI) based on bank loans. Range 0-1. Higher values 
denote more concentration of the banking industry of a country. 
BankScope 
BankScope 
World Economic 
Forum 
BankScope 
GDPG Rate of real per capita gross domestic product (GDP) growth World 
Development 
Indicators 
GDPC Natural logarithm of gross domestic product (GDP) in US dollars 
INFL Consumer price inflation rate  
 
 
 
Additional variables used in Further Analysis and Robustness checks 
S. Deviation of ROA 
ROA 
Three-year rolling-window standard deviation of the return on assets. 
Return on Average Assets 
BankScope 
BankScope 
Political rights  The index is calculated by average scores for political rights and civil liberties. 
Political rights measure the levels of political party competition, actual rule, real 
power of other political parties and the present of minority groups in politics. Civil 
liberties measure the degree to which freedom of expression, assembly, education 
and religion is expressed and freedom of economic activities and the fairness of legal 
system. Values range from 1 to 7, a lower value indicates a higher level of political 
rights. 
Freedom House 
Government Integrity Measures the levels of freedom of corruption in a country. The index is the average 
scores of six sub-factors: public trust in politicians, irregular payments and bribes, 
transparency of government policymaking, absence of corruption, perceptions of 
corruption, and governmental and civil service transparency. Range 0-100. 
Heritage 
Foundation index 
Property rights Measure of the extent to which a country’s laws protect private property rights. 
Range 0-100. 
Heritage 
Foundation index 
Legal structure The average figure of three legal structure indices. (1) Integrity of legal system 
which measures the strength and impartially of legal system and the observance of 
the law. (2) Legal enforcement of contracts measures the time cost and monetary cost 
required to collect a clear-cut debt, (3) Reliability of police measures the reliability 
of police services to enforce law and order in a country. A higher value implies a 
stronger legal structure.  Range 0-10. 
Fraser economic 
freedom index 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Natural logarithm of Z-score (Lnz-score) 5854 3.303 1.330 -5.016 10.575 
Restriction on banking activities (RES) 5695 7.621 1.988 3 12 
Capital stringency (CS) 5695 6.805 1.765 1 10 
Official supervisory power (OP) 5695 11.148 2.457 4 14 
Private monitoring (PM) 5695 7.930 1.432 4 11 
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Political stability (POL) 5690 -0.566 0.752 -2.28 2 
Control of corruption (CCOR) 5690 -0.542 0.501 -1.91 1.48 
Rule of law (RL) 5690 -0.538 0.522 -2.11 1.6 
Creditor rights (CR) 5611 5.124 2.233 0 10 
Information sharing (IS) 
Board Efficacy (CGOV) 
HHI index (HHI) 
5611 
5262 
5623 
2.996 
4.427 
0.171 
2.507 
0.386 
0.123 
0 
3.365 
0.031 
6 
6.021 
1 
Bank size (lnTA) 
Asset growth % (ASTGR) 
5695 
5695 
13.082 
7.726 
2.185 
5.789 
2.303 
-3.566 
21.947 
   17.504 
Equity to assets % (EQAS) 5695   14.643 8.982 3.567 91.725 
Loans to assets % (LOAN) 5585 62.873 5.193 23.820 96.312 
Provisions to loans % (LLPL) 5554 1.910 2.934 0.026 48.167 
GDP growth % (GDPG) 5813 4.739 3.454 -14.149 20.487 
Ln GDP per capita (GDPC) 5813 7.959 1.070 4.664 12.174 
Inflation % (INF) 5813 9.968 8.781 -11.161 75.438 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3. The Conditioning Effects of Institutional Quality on the Relationship between Bank Regulations and Bank Stability: 
The Cases of Capital Regulation and Supervisory Power 
 
    Capital Regulation x Institutional Quality (Models 1-5)               Supervisory Power x Institutional Quality (Models 6-10) 
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Notes: The table reports the effects of the interaction between institutional quality characteristics and capital regulation (CS) 
and supervisory power (OP) on bank stability over the period between 2004 and 2013. In models (1)-(10), the dependent 
variable is the natural log of the Z-score
 
(Lnz-score). lnTA is the natural logarithm of bank total assets, ASTGR is the growth 
rate of a bank’s assets, EQAS is bank capitalization, LOAN is loans to total assets, LLPL is the loan loss provisions, HHI is the 
Herfinfahl-Hirschman Index for bank industry concentration based on loans, CGOV is the corporate governance quality 
indicator, GDPG is GDP growth rate, GDPC is the natural logarithm of GDP per capita, INF is inflation rate, POL is political 
stability, CCOR is control of corruption, RL is rule of law, CR is creditor rights, IS is information sharing, CS is capital 
           (1)        (2)       (3)           (4)             (5) (6)    (7)         (8)    (9)     (10)               
VARIABLES       Lnz-score       Lnz-score       Lnz-score          Lnz-score      Lnz-score      Lnz-score        Lnz-score           Lnz-score         Lnz-score     Lnz-score                     
  
 
 
         
L.Lnz-score 0.477*** 0.469*** 0.466*** 0.459*** 0.466*** 0.478*** 0.470*** 0.463*** 0.479*** 0.464*** 
 (0.0308) (0.0309) (0.0308) (0.0303) (0.0318) (0.0303) (0.0302) (0.0307) (0.0316) (0.0306) 
lnTA 0.117*** 0.0926*** 0.0836*** 0.0888*** 0.0933*** 0.105*** 0.116*** 0.109*** 0.0890*** 0.0898*** 
 (0.0286) (0.0296) (0.0303) (0.0280) (0.0276) (0.0273) (0.0285) (0.0278) (0.0295) (0.0299) 
ASTGR -0.231*** -0.227*** -0.226*** -0.218*** -0.226*** -0.219*** -0.224*** -0.232*** -0.224*** -0.219*** 
 (0.0648) (0.0647) (0.0647) (0.0640) (0.0643) (0.0651) (0.0647) (0.0651) (0.0645) (0.0645) 
EQAS 0.0089*** 0.0081*** 0.0079*** 0.0089*** 0.0090*** 0.0084*** 0.0092*** 0.0081*** 0.0078*** 0.00883*** 
 (0.00230) (0.00240) (0.00238) (0.00235) (0.00233) (0.00235) (0.00231) (0.00227) (0.00238) (0.00237) 
LOAN 0.0050*** 0.0057*** 0.0061*** 0.0063*** 0.0063*** 0.00543*** 0.0052*** 0.0053*** 0.0058*** 0.00637*** 
 (0.00177) (0.00183) (0.00172) (0.00176) (0.00180) (0.00167) (0.00170) (0.00172) (0.00176) (0.00175) 
LLPL -0.0662*** -0.0716*** -0.0676*** -0.0693*** -0.0654*** -0.0722*** -0.0739*** -0.0722*** -0.0656*** -0.0670*** 
 (0.0121) (0.0101) (0.0107) (0.0117) (0.0125) (0.0101) (0.0103) (0.00982) (0.0117) (0.0121) 
HHI -0.226 -0.0744 -0.0755 -0.0309 -0.0430 -0.0743 -0.106 -0.0559 0.00791 -0.0442 
 (0.183) (0.176) (0.177) (0.175) (0.173) (0.175) (0.168) (0.178) (0.172) (0.173) 
CGOV 0.0553*** 0.0547*** 0.0581*** 0.0551*** 0.0562*** 0.0476*** 0.0554*** 0.0600*** 0.0639*** 0.0585*** 
 (0.0147) (0.0155) (0.0152) (0.0149) (0.0157) (0.0144) (0.0154) (0.0150) (0.0154) (0.0157) 
GDPG 0.00873* 0.0104** 0.0106** 0.0124** 0.0105** 0.0107** 0.0111** 0.0112** 0.0104** 0.0111** 
 (0.00485) (0.00487) (0.00492) (0.00483) (0.00493) (0.00482) (0.00476) (0.00483) (0.00472) (0.00482) 
GDPC 0.124*** 0.140*** 0.143*** 0.113*** 0.143*** 0.137*** 0.132*** 0.135*** 0.121*** 0.139*** 
 (0.0418) (0.0407) (0.0432) (0.0428) (0.0412) (0.0420) (0.0389) (0.0418) (0.0395) (0.0414) 
INF -0.0218*** -0.0225*** -0.0220*** -0.0211*** -0.0214*** -0.0222*** -0.0215*** -0.0221*** -0.0220*** -0.0211*** 
 (0.00292) (0.00284) (0.00298) (0.00295) (0.00300) (0.00305) (0.00287) (0.00286) (0.00281) (0.00285) 
POL  1.228*** 0.0161 0.0260 0.0239 0.0426 0.173 0.0178 0.0179 0.0240 0.0422 
 (0.338) (0.0552) (0.0551) (0.0562) (0.0538) (0.477) (0.0536) (0.0532) (0.0544) (0.0568) 
CCOR -0.430*** -1.181** -0.482*** -0.493*** -0.460*** -0.467*** -1.838** -0.460*** -0.409*** -0.490*** 
 (0.102) (0.593) (0.107) (0.105) (0.103) (0.102) (0.860) (0.106) (0.105) (0.105) 
RL 0.297** 0.311*** 0.00777 0.372*** 0.349*** 0.333*** 0.244** -0.589 0.283** 0.381*** 
 (0.116) (0.113) (0.485) (0.123) (0.118) (0.121) (0.117) (0.671) (0.125) (0.121) 
CR -0.0359** -0.0317** -0.0346** 0.230** -0.0304** -0.0316** -0.0190 -0.0249* -0.215 -0.0300** 
 (0.0141) (0.0124) (0.0139) (0.0935) (0.0138) (0.0136) (0.0126) (0.0140) (0.145) (0.0149) 
IS  0.0463***  0.0395***  0.0393***  0.0344** 0.108  0.0429***  0.0482***  0.0430***  0.0285** 0.172 
 (0.0138) (0.0142) (0.0140) (0.0140) (0.0868) (0.0136) (0.0138) (0.0139) (0.0133) (0.108) 
RES 0.527*** 0.433*** 0.467*** 0.390*** 0.484*** 0.444*** 0.421*** 0.459*** 0.469*** 0.486*** 
 (0.0820) (0.0853) (0.0831) (0.0846) (0.0831) (0.0762) (0.0807) (0.0810) (0.0861) (0.0817) 
CS 0.386*** 0.411** 0.340** 0.945*** 0.0880 0.194* 0.212** 0.176* 0.297*** 0.247** 
 (0.120) (0.162) (0.154) (0.254) (0.219) (0.103) (0.0983) (0.0969) (0.103) (0.104) 
OP -0.520*** -0.413*** -0.417*** -0.455*** -0.473*** -0.427*** -0.137 -0.257 -0.887*** -0.692*** 
 (0.122) (0.125) (0.121) (0.115) (0.120) (0.147) (0.210) (0.186) (0.338) (0.227) 
PM 0.0953 0.158 0.211 0.141 0.169 0.135 0.105 0.127 0.253 0.187 
 (0.167) (0.165) (0.169) (0.173) (0.174) (0.169) (0.164) (0.165) (0.163) (0.172) 
CS*POL  0.610***          
 (0.169)          
CS*COR 
 
0.355 
(0.292) 
        
CS*RL 
 
 0.175        
 
 
 (0.235)        
CS*CR 
 
  -0.135***       
 
 
  (0.0474)       
CS*IS 
 
   0.0355      
 
 
   (0.0433)      
OP*POL 
 
    -0.0735     
 
 
    (0.201)     
OP*COR 
 
     0.554*    
 
 
     (0.331)    
OP*RL  
 
      0.359 
(0.268) 
  
OP*CR 
 
 
       0.0754 
(0.0591) 
 
OP*IS 
 
           0.0557 
 
 
         (0.0445) 
Constant -1.312** -1.210* -0.921 -1.838** -0.593 -0.928 -1.893** -1.456* 0.382 -0.278 
 (0.644) (0.683) (0.698) (0.738) (0.743) (0.703) (0.775) (0.767) (0.987)  (0.790)  
Wald test 70.0*** 75.94*** 79.67*** 77.16*** 72.91*** 76.13*** 71.42*** 76.46***  74.63***       6.74***  
AR(2) p-value 0.500 0.529 0.495 0.487 0.530 0.532 0.546 0.488   0.483        0.522 
Hansen J p-value 
Time EF 
Country EF 
0.913 
Yes 
Yes 
0.894 
Yes 
Yes 
0.923 
Yes 
Yes 
0.952 
Yes 
Yes 
0.918 
Yes 
Yes 
0.898 
Yes 
Yes 
0.923 
Yes 
Yes 
0.933 
Yes 
Yes 
    0.704 
     Yes 
     Yes 
    0.893 
 Yes 
 Yes 
Obs. 4,689 4,689 4,689 4,689 4,689 4,689 4,689 4,689      4,689    4,689                     
Instruments 736 736 736 731 734  736   736 736       736               734 
N. of banks 1,052 1,052 1,052 1,052 1,052 1,052 1,052 1,052      1,052                1,052 
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regulation, OP is official supervisory power, RES is bank activities restrictions, PM is private monitoring. ***, ** and * 
indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4. The Conditioning Effects of Institutional Quality on the Relationship between Bank Regulations and Bank Stability: 
The Cases of Private Monitoring and Activities Restrictions 
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   Private Monitoring x Institutional Quality  (Model 1-5)               Activities Restrictions x Institutional Quality (Model 6-10) 
         (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
VARIABLES Lnz-score         Lnzr-score       Lnz-score      Lnz-score       Lnz-score       Lnz-score        Lnz-score       Lnz-score        Lnz-score       Ln-score 
           
L.Lnz-score 0.471*** 0.477*** 0.463*** 0.468*** 0.432*** 0.421*** 0.420*** 0.410*** 0.469*** 0.428*** 
 (0.0317) (0.0310) (0.0310) (0.0304) (0.0320) (0.0322) (0.0330) (0.0318) (0.0306) (0.0321) 
lnTA 0.0924*** 0.102*** 0.105*** 0.0985*** 0.118*** 0.114*** 0.167*** 0.157*** 0.0923*** 0.115*** 
 (0.0290) (0.0289) (0.0301) (0.0293) (0.0274) (0.0280) (0.0279) (0.0283) (0.0302) (0.0271) 
ASTGR -0.223*** -0.217*** -0.228*** -0.213*** -0.196*** -0.196*** -0.193*** -0.187*** -0.220*** -0.204*** 
 (0.0659) (0.0646) (0.0657) (0.0647) (0.0621) (0.0630) (0.0628) (0.0626) (0.0651) (0.0642) 
EQAS 0.00891*** 0.00850*** 0.00774*** 0.00872*** 0.0143*** 0.0138*** 0.0140*** 0.0146*** 0.00880*** 0.0137*** 
 (0.00237) (0.00239) (0.00242) (0.00241) (0.00276) (0.00274) (0.00283) (0.00276) (0.00240) (0.00282) 
LOAN 0.00667*** 0.00502*** 0.00458*** 0.00554*** 0.00771*** 0.00739*** 0.00564*** 0.00631*** 0.00658*** 0.00807*** 
 (0.00179) (0.00168) (0.00174) (0.00175) (0.00174) (0.00175) (0.00183) (0.00180) (0.00181) (0.00180) 
LLPL -0.0679*** -0.0732*** -0.0726*** -0.0658*** -0.0909*** -0.0909*** -0.0982*** -0.0949*** -0.0670*** -0.0908*** 
 (0.0111) (0.0103) (0.0114) (0.0122) (0.0106) (0.0108) (0.0108) (0.0103) (0.0118) (0.0109) 
HHI -0.0548 -0.0828 -0.101 -0.00564 -0.0311 -0.0740 -0.175 -0.0824 -0.0358 -0.0147 
 (0.172) (0.167) (0.179) (0.177) (0.179) (0.174) (0.176) (0.179) (0.173) (0.173) 
CGOV 0.0438*** 0.0534*** 0.0629*** 0.0574*** 0.0428*** 0.0411*** 0.0386*** 0.0396*** 0.0560*** 0.0422*** 
 (0.0152) (0.0164) (0.0149) (0.0149) (0.0139) (0.0140) (0.0137) (0.0139) (0.0145) (0.0143) 
GDPG 0.00924* 0.0121** 0.0128*** 0.0126*** 0.0119** 0.0107** 0.0110** 0.0109** 0.0119** 0.00952** 
 (0.00481) (0.00476) (0.00480) (0.00485) (0.00465) (0.00460) (0.00450) (0.00451) (0.00489) (0.00454) 
GDPC 0.130*** 0.142*** 0.132*** 0.132*** 0.0984** 0.121*** 0.0828** 0.125*** 0.122*** 0.119*** 
 (0.0420) (0.0400) (0.0417) (0.0404) (0.0400) (0.0423) (0.0420) (0.0426) (0.0393) (0.0397) 
INF -0.0218*** -0.0222*** -0.0217*** -0.0211*** -0.0176*** -0.0173*** -0.0182*** -0.0190*** -0.0212*** -0.0170*** 
 (0.00291) (0.00288) (0.00290) (0.00301) (0.00280) (0.00292) (0.00290) (0.00296) (0.00296) (0.00276) 
POL 0.634  0.0109 -0.00347  0.0145 0.0707   0.995***  0.0256 0.0611  0.0299 0.0572 
 (0.417) (0.0534) (0.0555) (0.0527) (0.0561) (0.296) (0.0542) (0.0540) (0.0566) (0.0567) 
CCOR -0.519*** 0.310 -0.314*** -0.492*** -0.453*** -0.544*** -2.290*** -0.454*** -0.472*** -0.525*** 
 (0.106) (0.596) (0.114) (0.108) (0.103) (0.102) (0.470) (0.107) (0.106) (0.109) 
RL 0.373*** 0.207* 1.567*** 0.330*** 0.409*** 0.434*** 0.340*** -1.174** 0.367*** 0.460*** 
 (0.123) (0.123) (0.508) (0.123) (0.120) (0.114) (0.108) (0.457) (0.131) (0.120) 
CR -0.0294** -0.0279** -0.0253** 0.223* -0.0209 -0.0213 -0.0212* -0.0142 0.0618 -0.0260* 
 (0.0139) (0.0119) (0.0128) (0.132) (0.0146) (0.0140) (0.0125) (0.0133) (0.0781) (0.0133) 
IS  0.0382***  0.0476***  0.0400***  0.0385*** 0.166  0.0321**  0.0350***  0.0395***  0.0353***  0.101 
 (0.0134) (0.0142) (0.0139) (0.0140) (0.127) (0.0126) (0.0122) (0.0125) (0.0134) (0.083) 
RES 0.467*** 0.429*** 0.502*** 0.462*** 0.442*** 0.580*** 0.673*** 0.636*** 0.697*** 0.0611 
 (0.0792) (0.0813) (0.0828) (0.0845) (0.0867) (0.100) (0.111) (0.110) (0.212) (0.166) 
CS 0.218** 0.250** 0.293*** 0.288*** 0.148 0.171* -0.0165 0.00574 0.247** 0.142 
 (0.110) (0.106) (0.104) (0.106) (0.0984) (0.101) (0.109) (0.106) (0.108) (0.0991) 
OP -0.374*** -0.442*** -0.465*** -0.480*** -0.429*** -0.321*** -0.284** -0.275** -0.448*** -0.403*** 
 (0.120) (0.118) (0.118) (0.116) (0.116) (0.120) (0.123) (0.127) (0.117) (0.117) 
PM   0.0371  0.201  0.531** 0.428  0.564*  0.260  0.228 0.212 0.226 0.206 
 (0.183) (0.185) (0.207) (0.395) (0.301) (0.177) (0.165) (0.174) (0.164) (0.171) 
PM*POL 0.300          
 
PM*CCOR 
(0.205)  
-0.318 
        
  (0.254)         
PM*RL   -0.676**        
   (0.269)        
PM*CR    -0.123*       
    (0.0648)       
PM*IS     0.0676      
     (0.0622)      
RES*POL      0.448*** 
(0.142) 
    
RES*CCOR                                 0.871*** 
(0.214) 
   
RES*RL        0.713*** 
(0.205) 
  
RES*CR         -0.0489 
(0.0415) 
 
RES*IS          0.0954** 
(0.0378) 
 
Constant -1.204* -0.845 -0.286 -2.130** -0.0173 -1.266* -1.534** -1.835** -1.100 -0.0684 
 (0.637) (0.647) (0.652) (1.036) (0.878) (0.705) (0.700) (0.784) (0.700) (0.736) 
Wald test 71.11*** 74.42*** 72.67*** 74.23*** 83.54*** 76.85*** 79.71*** 80.13*** 86.66*** 83.93*** 
Instruments       736 736 736 732 727 729 729 729 725 727 
AR(2) p-value 0.507 0.534 0.491 0.486 0.362 0.319 0.338 0.308 0.306 0.324 
Hansen J p-value 
Time Effects                                     
Country Effects 
0.946 
 
Yes 
Yes 
0.904 
 
Yes 
Yes 
0.932 
 
Yes 
Yes 
0.910 
 
Yes 
Yes 
0.965 
 
Yes 
Yes 
0.972 
 
Yes 
yes 
0.963 
 
Yes 
Yes 
0.961 
 
Yes 
Yes 
0.940 
 
Yes 
Yes 
0.952 
 
Yes 
Yes 
Observations 4,689 4,689 4,689 4,689 4,689 4,689 4,689 4,689 4,689 4,689 
N. of banks 1,052 1,052 1,052 1,052 1,052 1,052 1,052 1,052 1,052 1,052 
Notes: The table reports the effects of the interaction between institutional quality characteristics and private monitoring (PM) 
and activities restrictions (RES) on bank stability over the period between 2004 and 2013. In models (1)-(10), the dependent 
variables is the natural log of the Z-score
 
(Lnz-score). lnTA is the natural logarithm of bank total assets, ASTGR is the growth 
rate of a bank’s assets, EQAS is bank capitalization, LOAN is  loans to total assets, LLPL is the loan loss provisions, HHI is 
the Herfinfahl-Hirschman Index for bank industry concentration based on loans, CGOV is the corporate governance quality 
indicator, GDPG is GDP growth rate, GDPC is the natural logarithm of GDP per capita, INF is inflation rate, POL is political 
stability, CCOR is control of corruption, RL is rule of law, CR is creditor rights, IS is information sharing, CS is capital 
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regulation, OP is official supervisory power, RES is bank activities restrictions, PM is private monitoring. ***, ** and * 
indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Table 5. The Conditioning Effects of Institutional Quality on the Relationship between Bank Regulations and Bank Stability: Results from z-score Disaggregation 
Notes: The table reports the results of the further analysis based on the disaggregation of z-score. Thus, the dependent variables are the three following: the negative of profit volatility (the negative of standard deviation of 
ROA) is the -lnSDROA, the return on assets (ROA), and equity over total assets EQAS. POL is political stability, COR is control of corruption, RL is rule of law, CR is creditor rights, IS is information sharing, CS is capital 
regulation, RES is activities restrictions, PM is private monitoring. All models include the standard control variables and the individual institutional quality variables as in Tables 3 and 4. The models that the dependent 
variable is EQAS do not include EQAS as a control variable. ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
 
 
                                   Capital Reg x Pol. Stab. (1-3)                Capital Reg x Creditor Rights (4-6)           Priv. Monit. x Rule of Law (7-9)                   Act. Rest. x Pol. Stab. (10-12)              Act. Rest. x Cont. of Cor. (13-15)             Act. Rest. x Rule of law (16-18)           Act. Rest.  x Information Sh. (19-21)   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) 
VARIABLES 
-lnSDROA ROA EQAS -lnSDROA ROA EQAS -lnSDROA ROA EQAS -lnSDROA ROA EQAS -lnSDROA ROA EQAS -lnSDROA ROA EQAS -lnSDROA ROA EQAS 
                      
L.-lnSDROA 0.503***   0.506***   0.483***   0.490***   0.501***   0.495***     0.502***   
 (0.0227)   (0.0223)   (0.0229)   (0.0228)   (0.0219)   (0.0226)   (0.0228)   
L.ROAA  0.427***   0.448***   0.339***   0.334***   0.340***     0.339***   0.335***  
  (0.0765)   (0.0801)   (0.0674)   (0.0675)   (0.0674)   (0.0679)   (0.0675)  
L.EQAS   0.810***   0.808***     0.719***     0.714***   0.718***     0.716***   0.715*** 
   (0.0449)   (0.0443)   (0.0478)   (0.0478)   (0.0473)   (0.0528)   (0.0483) 
CS 0.418*** 0.0960 0.595 0.816*** -0.389 -1.101 0.248*** -0.488 0.207 0.197** -0.314 -0.0413      0.142 -0.361 -0.155 0.236** -0.490 -0.00677 0.283*** -0.215 -0.0421 
 (0.102) (0.444) (0.644) (0.222) (0.977) (1.351) (0.0949) (0.384) (0.674) (0.0961) (0.359) (0.678) (0.0927) (0.394) (0.678) (0.0939) (0.374) (1.842) (0.0903) (0.370) (0.641) 
PM -0.0739 0.452 0.154 -0.114 0.598 0.368  0.508** 0.297 -0.485 -0.225 0.445 1.915** -0.104 0.633 1.270 -0.115 0.438 1.256 -0.0828 0.152 1.478* 
 (0.157) (0.590) (0.762) (0.160) (0.540) (0.764) (0.215) (0.742) (1.463) (0.161) (0.544) (0.823) (0.152) (0.505) (1.144) (0.155) (0.522) (2.610) (0.157) (0.544) (0.848) 
RES 0.448*** 0.489* 0.466 0.360*** 0.138 0.413 0.393*** 0.420 0.376 0.399*** 0.694** 0.772 0.552*** 0.935*** 0.185 0.552*** 0.870*** 0.399 0.127 0.636 -0.725 
 (0.0704) (0.293) (0.508) (0.0745) (0.315) (0.537) (0.0730) (0.269) (0.541) (0.0928) (0.300) (0.626) (0.0981) (0.337) (1.170) (0.0969) (0.319) (1.346) (0.164) (0.538) (0.874) 
CS*POL 0.411*** 2.396*** 1.551*                   
 (0.151) (0.680) (0.858)                   
CS*CR    -0.102** 0.00279 0.225                
    (0.0415) (0.190) (0.254)                
PM*RL       -0.467* -0.335 -3.719             
       (0.252) (1.022) (2.377)             
RES*POL          0.161 0.945** 1.664**          
          (0.134) (0.386) (0.705)          
RES*COR                 0.495** 1.369** -0.0505       
             (0.197) (0.665) (1.335)       
RES*RL                0.387** 1.115* 0.709    
                (0.177) (0.600) (1.796)    
RES*IS                   0.0739* -0.0644 0.234 
                   (0.0383) (0.115) (0.196) 
                      
Constant -1.436** -7.023*** 6.834** -1.825*** -6.049** 7.859** -0.167 -5.362*** 8.164** -0.727 -6.143*** 1.611 -1.723*** -7.864*** 5.345 -1.721*** -7.134*** 4.640 -0.658 -5.357*** 6.933* 
 (0.596) (2.198) (2.837) (0.674) (2.649) (3.622) (0.644) (2.026) (3.658) (0.626) (1.831) (3.603) (0.642) (1.871) (5.517) (0.658) (2.068) (8.358) (0.694) (1.983) (3.573) 
Wald test 120.34*** 20.80*** 76.07*** 125.73*** 23.11*** 80.37*** 112.94*** 72.45*** 67.69*** 100.50*** 67.08*** 72.26*** 126.26*** 65.76*** 326.57*** 121.78*** 70.76*** 104.15*** 124.30*** 70.60*** 66.88*** 
AR(2) p-value 0.063 0.297 0.619 0.114 0.282 0.641 0.072 0.141 0.620 0.088 0.129 0.598 0.140 0.123 0.610 0.111 0.117 0.612 0.074 0.148 0.623 
Hansen J p-value 1 0.999 0.999 1 0.994 0.998 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.999 
Time Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country EF Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Control var. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4,689 4,687 4,689 4,689 4,687 4,689 4,689 4,687 4,689 4,689 4,687 4,689 4,689 4,687 4,689 4,689 4,687 4,689 4,689 4,687 4,689 
Instruments 736 736 736 736 736 736 736 736 736 736 736 736 736 736 736 736 736 736 736 736 736 
N. of banks 1,052 1,052 1,052 1,052 1,052 1,052 1,052 1,052 1,052 1,052 1,052 1,052 1,052 1,052 1,052 1,052 1,052 1,052 1,052 1,052 1,052 
39 
  
Table 6. The Conditioning Effects of Institutional Quality on the Relationship between Bank Regulations and Bank 
Stability: Evidence from Alternative Institutional Quality Measures and Principal Component Analysis 
Notes: The models 1-6 of this table report the regression results of the impact of the interaction between the alternative 
institutional quality measures and bank regulations on bank stability over the period between 2004 and 2013. The models 
                                     Alternative Institutional Quality measures x Bank Regulations (1-6)                      Pr. Component Variables(7-8)  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES Lnz-score Lnz-score Lnz-score Lnz-score Lnz-score Lnz-score Lnz-score Lnz-score 
         
L.Lnz-score 0.480*** 0.454*** 0.499*** 0.432*** 0.412*** 0.477*** 0.496*** 0.471*** 
 (0.0305) (0.0309) (0.0285) (0.0319) (0.0325) (0.0257) (0.0273) (0.0319) 
lnTA 0.0946*** 0.0948*** 0.0789*** 0.113*** 0.119*** 0.121*** 0.188*** 0.211*** 
 (0.0287) (0.0286) (0.0273) (0.0282) (0.0284) (0.0283) (0.0259) (0.0321) 
ASTGR -0.194*** -0.214*** -0.239*** -0.181*** -0.189*** -0.219*** -0.133** -0.132** 
 (0.0641) (0.0631) (0.0684) (0.0632) (0.0622) (0.0679) (0.0608) (0.0640) 
EQAS 0.00916*** 0.0127*** 0.00872*** 0.0145*** 0.0149*** 0.0127*** 0.0111*** 0.0108*** 
 (0.00246) (0.00272) (0.00245) (0.00282) (0.00278) (0.00270) (0.00217) (0.00271) 
LOAN 0.00555*** 0.00838*** 0.00911*** 0.00776*** 0.00830*** 0.00980*** 0.00412** 0.00275 
 (0.00173) (0.00180) (0.00199) (0.00179) (0.00174) (0.00189) (0.00167) (0.00181) 
LLPL -0.0698*** -0.0861*** -0.0634*** -0.0907*** -0.0910*** -0.0833*** -0.0789*** -0.0771*** 
 (0.0115) (0.0104) (0.0128) (0.0104) (0.0110) (0.0102) (0.00905) (0.0107) 
HHI -0.0914 -0.0590 -0.0609 -0.0349 -0.159 -0.0901 0.0898 -0.131 
 (0.175) (0.168) (0.198) (0.178) (0.188) (0.198) (0.141) (0.166) 
CGOV 0.0475*** 0.0463*** 0.0662*** 0.0395*** 0.0386*** 0.0565*** 0.00921 0.0115 
 (0.0149) (0.0140) (0.0161) (0.0132) (0.0147) (0.0154) (0.0105) (0.0136) 
GDPG 0.00945* 0.0103** 0.00991** 0.00981** 0.0108** 0.0113** 0.00251 0.0131*** 
 (0.00482) (0.00458) (0.00492) (0.00449) (0.00454) (0.00451) (0.00401) (0.00474) 
GDPC 0.107** 0.124*** 0.0438 0.0811** 0.106*** 0.0196 -0.00456  0.123*** 
 (0.0422) (0.0397) (0.0439) (0.0405) (0.0405) (0.0427) (0.0296) (0.0403) 
INF -0.0205*** -0.0195*** -0.0145*** -0.0169*** -0.0188*** -0.0111*** -0.0188*** -0.0189*** 
 (0.00282) (0.00274) (0.00336) (0.00270) (0.00299) (0.00307) (0.00254) (0.00271) 
PR -0.157 -0.0221 0.0336 -0.478* -0.0211 0.0373   
 (0.121) (0.0376) (0.0579) (0.281) (0.0349) (0.0388)   
GI -0.00312** -0.00282* -0.00328** -0.00204 -0.0497** -0.00256**   
 (0.00135) (0.00161) (0.00154) (0.00142) (0.0222) (0.00109)   
LS 0.0628 0.0529  1.085*** 0.0512 0.0561 0.371   
 (0.0415) (0.0436) (0.251) (0.0415) (0.0418) (0.226)   
PROP -0.00199 -0.00179 -0.00138 -0.00157 -0.00131 -0.00167   
 (0.00145) (0.0014) (0.00141) (0.00138) (0.00128) (0.00138)   
IS  0.0352**   0.0365***  0.00823  0.0282**    0.0372***  0.0132   
 (0.0140) (0.0118) (0.0149) (0.0121) (0.0120) (0.0138)   
RES 0.436*** 0.493*** 0.469*** 0.491*** 0.221* 0.201*   
 (0.0817) (0.0819) (0.0835) (0.0911) (0.118) (0.121)   
CS 0.360*** 0.161 0.320*** 0.221** 0.0872 0.207**   
 (0.124) (0.112) (0.104) (0.103) (0.113) (0.0984)   
OP -0.475*** -0.513*** -0.322*** -0.491*** -0.444*** -0.303***   
 (0.122) (0.118) (0.122) (0.118) (0.123) (0.117)   
PM 0.254 0.220  0.690***  0.483***       0.222  0.478***   
 (0.181) (0.171) (0.202) (0.183) (0.184) (0.178)   
CS*PR -0.164**        
 (0.076)        
CS*PROP  -0.000456       
  (0.00181)       
PM*LS   -0.609***      
   (0.228)      
RES*PR    -0.221*     
    (0.113)     
RES*GI      0.0330**    
     (0.0148)    
RES*LS       0.590***   
      (0.214)   
REG           0.0109  0.0560 
           (0.0244) (0.0362) 
IQ        0.0867***  
       (0.0227)  
CRIS        0.0388 
        (0.0460) 
REG*IQ       0.0304**  
 
 
      (0.0123)  
REG*CRIS             -0.0451 
(0.0334) 
         
Constant -0.402 -0.511 -0.224 0.169 -0.538 -0.324 -1.068*** -0.282 
 (0.664) (0.689) (0.660) (0.686) (0.704) (0.661) (0.318) (0.512) 
Wald test 74.23*** 96.73*** 71.30*** 84.30*** 84.56*** 66.18*** 114.92*** 74.49*** 
AR(2) p-value 0.486 0.425 0.074 0.302 0.285 0.123 0.193 0.363 
Hansen J p-value 0.945 0.933 0.986 0.974 0.953 0.982 0.238 0.040 
Time EF. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country EF Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Control var. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4,689 4,689 4,689 4,689 4,689 4,689 4,689 4,689 
Instruments 736 736 736 736 736 736 736 736 
N. of Banks 1,052 1,052 1,052 1,052 1,052 1,052 1,052 1,052 
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7-8 of this table report the regression results using principal component analysis variables. In models 1-8, the dependent 
variables is the natural log of the Z-score
 
(Lnz-score). lnTA is the natural logarithm of bank total assets, ASTGR is the 
growth rate of a bank’s assets, EQAS is bank capitalization, LOAN is loans to total assets, LLPL is the loan loss 
provisions, HHI is the Herfinfahl-Hirschman Index for bank industry concentration based on loans, CGOV is corporate 
governance quality indicator, GDPG is GDP growth rate, GDPC is the natural logarithm of GDP per capita, INF is 
inflation rate, , CS is capital requirements regulation, OP is official supervisory power, RES is bank activities 
restrictions, PM is private monitoring, PR is political rights, PROP is the property rights, LS is the strength of legal 
structure, GI is the government integrity, IQ is the principal component of control of corruption (COR), political stability 
(POL) and the rule of law (RL), CRIS is the principal component of creditor rights CR) and information sharing (IS) and 
REG is the principal component of the four bank regulation and supervision variables (CS, OP, PM, RES).***, ** and * 
indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Appendices 
Table A1: List banks and observations by country 
Country Banks  Obs Country Banks  Obs 
Algeria 15 95 Maldives 1 4 
Argentina 69 628 Mali 5 7 
Armenia 15 133 Malta 7 19 
Bangladesh 26 75 Mauritius 14 53 
Belarus 21 143 Montenegro 8 35 
Belize 3 25 Mozambique 12 85 
Benin 7 33 Namibia 6 23 
Bhutan 3 13 Nicaragua 3 4 
Bolivia 9 13 Niger 5 29 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 24 94 Pakistan 27 97 
Botswana 7 29 Panama 44 163 
Brazil 87 323 Peru 6 26 
Bulgaria 24 195 Philippines 23 91 
Burkina Faso 9 42 Rep. of Moldova 14 52 
Burundi 4 20 Romania 25 105 
Colombia 23 90 Russian Federation 6 19 
Cote D'Ivoire  10 46 Saint Lucia 3 12 
Dominica 1 6 Saint Vincent and the Grenadines  1 3 
Dominican Rep. 41 149 Senegal 7 49 
Egypt 21 87 Serbia 26 100 
El Salvador 15 56 Sierra Leone 7 19 
Ethiopia 8 26 Slovakia 14 58 
Ghana 21 74 South Africa 13 52 
Grenada 2 14 Sri Lanka 16 46 
Guatemala 4 17 Suriname 4 14 
Guyana 3 27 Thailand 22 91 
India 56 227 Togo 4 25 
Indonesia 69 595 Turkey 29 108 
Jamaica 7 56 Uganda 15 58 
Jordan 11 59 Uruguay 39 344 
Kenya 28 113 Vanuatu 2 9 
Kyrgyzstan 6 32 Venezuela 32 127 
Lebanon 35 201 Zimbabwe 10 36 
Macedonia, FYR  12 84 
Malawi 5 51 
Malaysia 5 22       
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Table A2: Correlation matrix  
  lnZscore RES CS OP PM POL CCOR RL CR IS lnTA EQAS LOAN LLPL GDPG GDPC INF CGOV HHI ASTGR 
lnZscore 1                 
RES 0.05 1                
CS 0.14 0.26 1               
OP 0.03 0.3 0.27 1              
PM -0.02 0.22 0.27 0.15 1             
POL 0.21 -0.26 -0.34 -0.12 0.03 1            
COR -0.12 -0.13 -0.16 0.1 0.24 0.65 1           
RL 0.03 -0.09 -0.05 0.12 0.27 0.54 0.86 1          
CR 0.09 0.03 0.18 0.06 0.13 0.06 0.01 0.23 1         
IS -0.05 -0.22 -0.1 -0.07 0.25 0.27 0.27 0.21 -0.08 1        
lnTA 0.21 0.03 0.22 0.1 0.14 -0.27 0.01 0.11 0.06 0.14 1       
EQAS 0.01 -0.09 -0.14 -0.02 -0.04 0.12 0.03 -0.03 -0.06 0.06 -0.48 1      
LOAN 0.1 -0.06 0.06 0.06 0.03 0.05 -0.02 0.05 0.22 0.09 0.09 -0.14 1     
    LLPL -0.05 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.02 0.01 0.05 -0.04 1    
GDPG 0.01 0.18 0.05 -0.03 0.13 -0.09 -0.07 -0.05 -0.05 -0.09 -0.03 -0.03 -0.11 0.01 1   
GDPC -0.04 -0.29 -0.2 -0.02 -0.1 0.4 0.46 0.33 -0.21 0.6 0.13 0.09 -0.05 0.01 -0.18 1  
INF -0.21 0.14 -0.12 -0.07 0.03 -0.01 -0.16 -0.35 -0.22 0.12 -0.06 0.07 -0.14 0.01 0.05 0.11 1 
CGOV 0.08 -0.03 0.06 0.34 0.22 0.14 0.18 0.26 0.16 0.30 0.15 -0.02 0.14 0.01 -0.05 0.11 -0.15 1 
HHI 
-0.06 0.02 -0.11 -0.05 -0.21 0.15 0.14 0.10 -0.12 -0.30 -0.15 -0.01 -0.11 -0.01 0.02 -0.14 -0.01 -0.28 1 
ASTGR 
-0.09 0.04 0.05 0.15 -0.05 -0.03 -0.01 0.02 0.02 -0.07 0.15 -0.13 0.09 -0.02 0.07 -0.04 -0.20 0.08 0.03 1 
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Figure A1:  Theoretical model of how Institutional Quality could condition the effect of Capital Regulation, Private Monitoring, and Supervisory Power on Bank Stability 
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Figure A2:  Theoretical model of how Institutional Quality could condition the effect of Activities Restrictions on Bank Stability 
 
 
